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Brussels In  this  report, which the Commission has decided  to make public, all the problems connected 
with the increase in  the powers of the European Parliament and  the institutional development 
of the Communities are considered. 
The report, which will furnish the Commission with some very  useful  ideas for. consideration, 
has  been  drawn  up  completely  independently  by fourteen  well-known  authorities  under  the 
chairmanship of Dean Georges  Vedel;  they  alone are responsible for the views expressed. 
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83 INTRODUCTION 
With the creation of the Communities' independent financial resources by the 
decision  of  21  April  19701  and  the  amendments  made  to  the  budgetary 
provisions  of  the  treaties  by  the  treaty  of  Luxembourg  of  22  April  1970,2 
the problem of the strengthening of the legislative  and budgetary powers  of 
the European Parliament has assumed a new topicality.  This is  further rein-, 
forced by the prospects opened up by the resolution of the Council and of the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 22  March 1971 
concerning the introduction by stages of economic and monetary union.3  For 
its part the Commission has formally  undertaken vis-a-vis  both the European 
Parliament and the Council to submit proposals for such strengthening.  4 
With a  view  to  preparing the measures  for  which it will  thus have to take 
the initiative, the Commission decided at its meeting of 22  July 1971 to set up 
an ad hoc Working Party of independent experts to examine the whole corpus 
of problems connected  with  the enlargement of the powers of  the European 
Parliament. 
The  Working  Party,  under  the  chairmanship  of  Professor  Georges  _Vedel, 
Honorary  Dean  of  the  Paris  Faculty  of  Law  and  Economic  Sciences,  was 
composed of: 
Jean Buchmann, Professor in the University of Louvain; 
Leopolda Elia, Professor in the University of Rome; 
Carl August Fleischer, Professor in the University of Oslo; 
Jochen A.  Frowein, Professor in the University of Bielefeld; 
Giuseppe Guarino, Professor in the University of Rome; 
Paul Kapteyn, Professor in the University of Utrecht; 
Maurice Lagrange, Honorary Counsellor of State, Paris; 
John Mitchell, Professor in the University of Edinburgh; 
Mary Robinson, Professor in the University of Dublin; 
Ulrich Scheuner, Professor in the University of Bonn; 
Andrew  Shonfield,  Director  of  the  Royal  Institute  of  International 
Affairs, London; 
Max S0rensen, Professor in the University of Aarhus; 
Felix  Welter, Honorary President of the Council of State, Luxembourg. 
1  See Journal officiel L 94, 28  April 1970, p. 19. 
2  Ibid. 'L 2, 2 January 1971, p.  L 
3  Ibid.  C 28, 27 March 1971, p. 1. 
4  See on this point the declaration included by the Council in its minutes concerning the Treaty 
of 22  April  1970 and "Les  ressources propres aux Communautes europeennes et les  pouvoirs 
budgetaires  du Parlement europeen",  published  by  the European  Parliament,  1970,  p.  204. 
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The Working Party's terms of reference were as  follows: 
(a)  The ad hoc Working Party will examine all the implications of extending 
the powers of the European Parliament: 
(i)  bearing in mind the possibility of a gradual extension of the powers 
of the  Commqnity  and  of  the  gradual transfer  qf  certain  prerogatives 
from the institutions of the States  to the Community institutions to be 
carried out with the free consent of all Member States; 
(ii)  with a view to providing the Community with an effective institu-
tional system; 
(iii)  with a view to ensuring that Community decisions are taken within 
a framework of democratic legitimacy; 
(iv)  taking into consideration the constitutional principles and practices 
of the Member States of the Community. 
(b)  To carry  out this  task,  the ad hoc Working Party  should  examine  in 
particular the following subjects: 
8 
(i)  the  participation  of  the  European  Parliament  in  the  continuous 
evolution of the constitution of the Community, namely in the complex 
process  which  involves  in  various  ways  the  Commission,  the  Council, 
the  national  governments  and  parliaments,  and in  some  cases,  people 
directly by referendum, and which aims at giving the Community further 
powers, reforming its institutions and thus at gradually building political 
umon; 
(ii)  the  participation  of the  European  Parliament  in  the  Community 
legislative  process  in  all  fields  which  are or will  be  covered  by  Com-
munity powers.  This study should cover in particular: the relationship 
between  Community law and municipal  law;  the  relationship  between 
the various legal  "acts" provided for in the Treaties; the nature of the 
decisions  taken  by  the  Council  which  are  sometimes  legislative  in 
character,  sometimes  governmental  and  sometimes  have  an inter-State 
diplomatic character; the division of legislative and other powers between 
the Parliament and the Council; the Parliament's power of initiative; 
(iii)  the  definition  of  the  European  Parliament's  power in  budgetary 
matters; 
(iv)  the European Parliament's functions  in political control over the 
governmental power of the Community; 
(v)  the  effects  of  increasing  the  powers  of  the  Parliament  on  the 
relationship between the various Community institutions, on their structure 
and on their working methods; 
(vi)  the relationship  between reinforcing  the Parliament's  powers  and 
its election by direct universal suffrage. 
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Between  26  October  1971  and  25  March  1972  the  Working  Party  held 
11  sessions,  some of theri1  lasting one day,  but most of them two.  The last 
went on for five  days. 
The Working  Party  drew  up  its  report  on  the  basis  of  preparatory  reports 
drawn  up  by  its  members  and  of the  documentation  made  available  to  it. 
It also heard evidence from leading personalities in the Commission and outside. 
it. 
After setting out the method which the Working Party followed in its thinking 
and in its choices (Chapter I), the report describes the state of the Community 
in 1972 (Chapter II)  and the present institutions and practice in the light of the 
tasks  awaiting the  Community  (Chapter III).  It is  on this  analysis that the 
proposals in the report are based.  They deal chiefly with the organization of 
parliamentary control and to this  end envisage  successively  the extension of 
the powers of the Europ_ean  Parliament, which lies at the heart of the Working 
Party's terms of reference (Chapter IV), its composition (Chapter V)  and rela-
tions between it and the national parliaments (Chapter VI). 
However, the problem of parliamentary control cannot be considered in isola-
tion.  It therefore seemed necessary then to take a  wider view of the adjust-
ments to be made to the whole institutional system of the Community in order 
to enable the latter to exercise a greater dynamism in the discharge of the respon-
sibilities which may be  expected to be further extended in the years to come 
(Chapter Vii). 
Finally, the Working Party felt it could not conclude its repmt without indicating 
the ways in which the proposed reforms could be implemented (Chapter VIII). 
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Methods  and  selection  criteria 
The  collective  task  entrusted  to  the  Working  Party  by  the  Commission 
presupposed a concerted effort by its members on a continuing basis to arrive 
at common points of view, solutions and judgments.  This concerting of efforts 
was  bound  to  be  rendered  easier  by  the  fact  that  the  subject  could  be 
approached objectively and functionally. 
The approach was objective in that the point of departure for the analysis was 
a  statement of  facts  which form  the  basis  of  the two following  chapters  on 
"The Community in  1972"  and on "The institutions and current practice in 
the light of the tasks awaiting the Community". 
It is observed that the Community has made considerable progress in its develop-
ment but that it is  far from having come to full  growth.  If, as  regards both 
structure and activities, other results must be achieved in the future, this is  so 
not only because such results appear desirable, but first and foremost because 
they correspond to the full  accomplishment of the stipulations of the Treaties 
and  what is  even  more important,  because  they  correspond to  the  political 
will clearly expressed by the Member States to give the Community new tasks. 
Furthermore, the objectivity of the method is  due to the Working Party having 
based its activities on the two criteria laid down in the mandate given to it by 
the Commission: democracy and effectiveness. 
Very fortunately, the criterion of democracy does not lend itself, in the present 
case, to any form of subjective interpretation.  Even though the institutions of 
the States which form  or will form the Community may exhibit appreciable 
differences, these differences do not call into question the fundamental concept 
of democracy.  In all the States, this is essentially conceived in identical terms : 
the citizens of the country are the sole source of power; they possess rights and 
liberties valid as  against the State and its  organs; those who wield power are 
designated by genuine and meaningful elections; the political parties are free; 
the right of opposition is  a  fundamental fact  of political  and social  life;  the 
status and role of the parliament with regard to the executive are an essential part 
of  democracy;  in  relation  to  law-making,  the ·parliament is  vested  with  the 
highest  power;  in  one  form  or  another,  it  exercises  supervision  over  the 
government. 
In addition, the Working Party based itself on the institutions of the different 
Member States or future Member States of the Community, as the Commission 
requested it to do. 
Admittedly, it would not be possible to apply these general principles to the Com-
munity framework automatically.  The Community is  equipped with original 
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structures which correspond, at a given moment, to its nature and its tasks and 
which  prohibit the drawing of  over-simple  and basically  inaccurate parallels 
such as those which would misconstrue the complex role of the Council (which 
is  governmental and legislative at the same time)  or which would reduce the 
Commission to the level of a mere administrative machine (whereas the treaties 
involve it fundamentally with Community responsibilities). 
It must also be borne in mind that the origin of the Governments represented in 
the Council and that of the members of the European Parliament is  such that 
their Community powers actually rest on a  process  of democratic legitimacy 
in  the  national framework.  But the requirement  of  democracy  common to 
the Member States, which is  going to be  reaffirmed through the accession of 
new  States,  tends  and will  probably tend  more and more,  to develop  really 
Community democratic mechanisms. 
Whatever  the  priority  which,  according  to  one view  or  another,  should  be 
attributed in the building of Europe to this or that instrument of Community 
action,  the  European Parliament's  position in the  Community constitutes  in 
itself  a  problem  which  is  very  important  and,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
democratic legitimation, fundamental.  Moreover, it is  this problem that the 
Commission has designated as central to the report required from the Working 
Party. 
The criterion of efficacy, in so far as  it entails conjectures on the consonance 
of the means with the ends pursued, involves judgments which cannot be alto-
gether  objective.  For,  espec:,ally  when it is  a  matter of foreseeing  what the 
results will be, in the more or less long term, of one or other legal rule or practice, 
the calculation of efficacy contains a large element of judgement which is personal 
and hence subjective.  · The Working Party could  neither avoid this fact  nor 
adopt the easy  solution of listing the possible  choices  without reaching  a,ny 
conclusion. 
It has  therefore tried to  solve this problem in three ways.  Firstly,  acting  as 
a body, it has not taken its stand on ideological or theoretical structures apart 
from the democratic principle itself.  It has looked for practical ways of making 
progress along the road of a democratic Community.  Secondly, the Working 
Party's discussions have tended not primarily to reach a majority point of view 
but to find a general consensus on solutions which, as often as not, are not the 
results of simple compromises but rather from a common conClusion. 
Finally,  on  certain  points  where  subjective  evaluations  prevented  a  single 
opinion from being reached, the fact has been mentioned in the report, to enable 
the Commission to take note of the difficulty. 
These premises explain why the Working Party can also describe its approach 
as  functional.  This term, which expresses the Working Party's fidelity  to its 
remit, has various meanings, but they all  tend in the same direction. 
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The first sense of the term translates the idea that the concrete proposals, to be 
presented  are not the result,  either  of  theories  or of  purely personal  prefer-
ences.  However, it has been possible to arrive at overall views simply by asking 
what democratic and effective  instruments  were  required in order to achieve 
the  European  objectives  desired  and  affirmed  by  the  Member  States. 
Proceeding from what exists and has its value, what is  needed is  an unbroken 
evolution.  Accordingly,  the Working Party has taken as  a  guiding principle 
the  rejection  of  all  complicated,  useless  and  dangerous  mechanisms  which 
would place the concerted actions envisaged by the Member States outside the 
framework of the Community. 
The second  meaning which can be given to the idea of a functional  method 
leads  to  our  discarding,  where  they  arise,  categories  which  are  no  doubt 
generally  accepted  but  which  cannot  be  applied  in  the  Community  sphere. 
There may be no absolute equivalence, especially in a  phase of  construction, 
between the role of a national parliament and that of a European Parliament, 
between the role  of  a  national  executive  and that of a  European executive. 
Already, in some of our national contexts, the political reality of the exercise 
of  legislative  power  or  budgetary  power,  or  the  political  responsibility  of 
government  to  parliament,  is  no  longer  in  conformity  with  the  theories  o£ 
classic  constitutional law.  This is  one more reason for  not taking  a  priori 
views between which it would be sometimes difficult to choose. 
Thirdly, a functional method entails a search for minimum legal modifications 
in order to  achieve  maximum political results  and a  preference for  what is 
effective to what is  spectacular. 
Finally, a  functional  method presupposes that one does  not put forward the 
hypothesis that everything which is desirable is immediately possible, as though · 
the changes of a society could be decreed without taking into account the real 
situation of  political  and  social forces.  At times,  a  solution  which is  more 
practically feasible-provided it represents a step towards the final objective-
has to be preferred to a solution which is ideally better.  It is necessary to take 
account of  time,  which is  a  factor of development in itself  because it  bears 
experience  with it.  This  means  that just  as  in the past in the  Community, 
an important place will have to be given to the idea of gradualness, which often 
reconciles the desirable and the possible. 
The present report will therefore in no way be a theoretical list of instant reforms. 
As  has  been  said,  its  starting point has  been  the  existing  Treaties  and the 
Working Party,  though it  has  not abstained from  suggesting  certain precise 
revisions, has neither been naive enough nor presumptuous enough to believe 
that the Commission's mandate invited it to rewrite the Treaties. 
Certainly it has not been possible to mention all  the problems  raised by the 
progress of the European institutions-especially in view of the fact that, broad 
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though they were, the Working Party's terms of reference  were none the less 
precise.  For instance, it did not seem possible to deal with the question, often 
put forward in the most widely  differing  circles,  of  the link which might be 
established between regional structures and Community structures. 
On  the  basis  of  the  terms  of  reference  laid  down,  the  report  therefore 
endeavours  to ascertain  the points  on which progress, combining democracy 
and efficacy,  will have the threefold merit of  being founded on what already 
exists;  of  only  modifying  the  present  system  as  far as  is  strictly  useful  and 
finally,  of shaping the future not by  pure legal fiats  but by  setting in motion 
socio-political processes  which carry conviction,  are progressive,  and for this 
very  reason,  compulsive. 
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SECTION I 
RESULTS  TO DATE 
Notwithstanding  all  the  crises  in  its  fortunes  the  European  Economic 
Community (EEC),  set up in  1958,  has  changed the face  of Western Europe. 
ECSC  was  the  start  of  a  process  brought  temporarily  to  a  halt  when  the 
project for a European Defence Community foundered.  Euratom is  an impor-
tant,  but  a  highly  specialized 'body.  In  the  merger  of  the  three  sets  of 
institutions, it is  the EEC  which forms  both the central core and the primary 
field of action of Community Europe.  And now, hard upon the Community's 
entering its "definitive period", the accession of a number of new States is going 
to add still  more to its weight in Europe and in the world. 
Though yet  incomplete,  the  Community's  achievements  are  impressive-the 
customs  union  fully  in  place,  the single  agricultural  market  established,  the 
main obstacles to free  movement of workers disposed of, Community law on 
competition duly framed and in the safe keeping of the  Commission and the 
Court of Justice, insufficient but not inconsiderable ptogr~s  made on harmoniza-
tion of legislation, freedom  of  establishment and freedom to provide services. 
Ass1)ciation agreements with many countries and the conclusion of trade agree-
ments with others are witness to the Community's ramifying relations with the 
worid outside. 
And  last  but  not  least,  the  Community  institutions  are  joining  with  the 
Member  States  in  preparing  a  development  policy  in  respect  of  the  Third 
World. 
SECTION II 
THE TASKS  AWAITING THE COMMUNITY 
1.  Achievement of the assignments laid down in the Treaties 
However, the Community has  by  no means  done all it set out to do, even in 
regard to matters on which specific actions should have been completed before 
the end  of the transitional period.  The common transport policy has made 
little headway; free  movement of capital is  only in its  earliest beginnings; all 
the restrictions  on freedom  of  establishment to provide services  especially  in 
the case of the liberal professions are far from having been abolished. 
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The coordination of econoniic policies provided for in Article 105  of the EEC 
. Treaty has encountered even more difficulties than the more clear-cut processes 
just referred to.  And yet the distortions in the short-term state of the individual 
national economies have often been alarming, giving rise to imbalances which 
have  been at any rate partly responsible for the erratic course of the rates of 
exchange since the devaluation of the French franc and revaluation of the mark 
in  1969.  The  makers  of  the  Treaty  never  visualized  the possibility  of the 
problems assuming such proportions, and provided only for incidental ad hoc 
action,  notably  in  Article  107  EEC.  But in  fact  these  changes  in  exchange 
rates  were  to interfere most seriously with the· whole concept of a  common 
market, especially a common market in agricultural products.  It is  becoming 
apparent that unless  the very foundations  of the Common Market are· to be 
ruined monetary policy  must be  a  European-level affair.  Upon this  premise 
is  based the project for economic and monetary union. 
2.  The political will to extend the tasks  of the Community-Economic and 
monetary union 
It  was  the  Governments  themselves  which  made  the  first  move  towards 
extending and reinforcing the Communities'  operations  by  the establishment 
of  an  economic  and  monetary  union.  At  The  Hague  Conference  of 
1/2 December 1969, the Heads of State or Government agreed to expedite the 
transition from customs union to economic union.1 
Pursuant  to  this  agreement,  a  Working  Party  headed  by  the  Luxembourg 
Prime Minister, Mr Werner, was set up by Council decision to prepare a report 
on the phased establishment of  economic and monetary union.  An  interim 
report  by  the  Working  Party  on  20  May  19702  was  considered  by  the 
Council; the final  report, known as  the Werner Report,3  was delivered to the 
Council  and  Commission  on  13  October  1970,  and  communicated  to  the 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. 
On  the  basis  of  the  Report  the  Council  and  the  representatives  of  the 
Governments of  the Member States,  on 22  March 1971,  passed a  resolution 
on the establishment of economic and monetary union.  In this they recorded 
their political will  to introduce economic  and monetary union over the next 
ten years, in accordance with a phased plan commencing on 1 January 1971. 
At the end of this process, the resolution went on, the Community must: 
-
1.  constitute a zone within which persons, goods, services  and capital will 
move freely  and without distortion of competition, without, however,  gtvmg 
1  Journal officiel C 136, 11  November 1970, p. 15. 
2  Ibid.  C 94, 23  July 1970, p. 1. 
3  Ibid.  C 136, 11  November 1970,  p.  1. 
4  Ibid. C 28, 27 March 1971, p. 1. 
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rise  to  structural or regional  imbalances  and in  conditions which will  allow 
economic factors to operate on a  Community scale; 
2.  form  a  distinctive  monetary  unit  within  the  international  system, 
characterized  by  the  total  and  irreversible  convertibility  of  currencies,  the 
elimination of margins of fluctuation of rates of exchange and the irrevocable 
fixing  of  parity rates-which is  the indispensable  condition for  the creation 
of a single currency-and including a Community system for the Central Banks; 
3.  hold the powers and responsibilities in the economic and monetary field 
enabling its institutions to organize the administration of the union.  To this 
end the required economic policy decisions shall be taken at Community level 
and the necessary powers shall be given to the institutions of the Community. 
Powers  and  responsibilities  (the  resolution  continues)  shall  be  distributeq 
between  the  institutions  of  the  Communities  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
Member States on the other hand, in accordance with the requirements for the 
cohesion of the union and the effectiveness of Community action. 
The institutions of the Community shall be enabled to exercise their respon-
sibilities  with  regard  to  economic  and  monetary  matters  with  efficacy  and 
speed. 
The Community policies implemented within the framework of the economic 
and ·monetary union shall be subject to discussion and control by the European 
Parliament. 
The Community system for the Central Banks shall assist, within the context 
of its  own responsibilities, in achieving the objectives of stability and growth 
of the Community. 
The principles laid down above shall be applied to the following subjects: 
the internal monetary and credit policy of the union; 
monetary policy vis-a-vis the external world; 
policy in respect of the unified capital market and .movements of capital 
to and from third countries; 
budgetary and fiscal policy. as it affects the policy of stability and growth: 
as  regards budgetary policy proper, the margins within which the main 
items of all  the public  budgets must  be  situated shall  be determined at 
Community level, with particular reference to the variation in their sizes, 
the extent of the balances  and the methods  of financing  and using the 
latter; 
the  structural  and  regional  measures  called  for  in  the  context  of  a 
Community policy possessing appropriate means so  that it may likewise 
contribute to the balanced development of the Community, in particular 
with a view to solving the most important problems. 
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The resolution  does  not,  incidentally,  refer to certain institutional proposals 
in the Report, one of which was that there should be set up a "centre of decision 
for economic policy" to "exercise independently, in accordance with the Com-
munity interest, a  decisive  influence  over the general economic policy of  the 
Community".  Concerning  the  European  Parliament,  the  Werner  Report 
added: "The centre of decision for economic policy will be politically responsible 
to a European Parliament.  The latter will have to have a status corresponding 
to the extension of the Community's tasks,  not only from  the point of  view 
of the extent of its powers, but also having regard to the method of election of 
its members." 
The Parliament's own resolution1  on the Werner Report also emphasized that 
"any transfer of powers in economic and monetary matters from the national 
authorities  to  the  Community  niust  be  accompanied,  to  ensure  democratic 
control, by an increase in the powers of the European Parliament". 
A last point to be noted on this vital subject of economic and monetary union 
is that it is  not expressly covered as  such by the EEC Treaty, despite the fact 
that the Treaty does provide-even beyond the customs union-for coordina-
tion of economic policies  (Article  105),  and includes  as  "matters of common 
concern"  short-term  economic  policy  ("conjunctural  policy")  and  policy  on 
rates of exchange (Articles 103  and 107).  It does not necessarily follow from 
this that economic and monetary union would in any event involve revising the 
Treaty as Article 235 EEC could serve as the basis for a number of moves in this 
field.  The essential point is that, in one way or another, economic and mone-
tary union will require the further development of Community organs. 
3.  Regional  and social  policy 
The resolution of 22 March 1971  expressly recognizes the responsibility of the 
Community in respect of regional policy.  In an economic and monetary union, 
where all  barriers have been abolished, not only, for free  movement of goods 
and of workers but also for capital and investment, it is  the ·role of regional 
policy to ensure the development of those areas which are under-industrialized 
or in need of  structural change.  The Community has already taken various 
steps  in  this  connection.  The Commission  has  submitted proposals for  the 
organization of Community means of action in regard to regional development 
and in particular for the setting-up of a Regional Fund but these have not yet 
been accepted by the Council. 
On  social  policy,  concerning  which  the  Treaty  makes  explicit  provision  in 
Article  117  et  seq.,  there  has  been  extensive  Community  activity.  The 
1  journal officiel C 151, 29  December 1970, p  23. 
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Commission's views  on the subject were recently set forth in the Preliminary 
Guidelines  for  a  Community Social  Policy  Programme,  of  1T March  1971,1 
which listed the following priority objectives for concerted Community action 
in the first stage of economic and monetary union: 
expedited completion of the common employment market; 
absorbing underemployment and structural unemployment; 
improved safety and health conditions both at work and otherwise; 
improving the status of working women; 
encouraging the absorption of handicapped persons into normal working 
life; 
institution of medium-term social forecasting; 
securing closer cooperation by the two sides of industry. 
The Preliminary  Guidelines  do  not contain formal  proposals.  The Council 
has not yet made known its reactions to thein. 
4.  Environmental policy 
The last of  the  sectors  on which the  Commission  has· recommended  a  JOlllt 
policy is the environment.  This is the subject of the First Commission Memo-
randum on Community Environmental Policy, of 22 July 1971, which lists five 
sets of priority objectives: 
reduction of the concentration of  some of the most dangerous  air and 
water pollutants; 
reduction in pollution caused by the use of certain commercial products 
and by substances released in industrial production; 
fuller  knowledge  concerning pollutants  (their  origin,  dissemination  and 
effects),  with special reference to achieving the above  objectives; 
· area and environmental planning; 
carrying-out of  basic studies needed in· order to understand, define and 
tackle  more  effectively  environmental  problems  not  included  in  those 
mentioned above. 
The Commission adds that in addition to.these activities there should be greater 
Community participation in the work of the international organizations  a-nd 
cooperation with third countries. 
1  Supplement 2-1971 : Annex to Bulletin of the European Communities 4-71. 
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5.  Political  union 
Closer political cooperation between the Member States, especially on foreign 
policy, has inspired the work of the Community institutions from the beginning. 
This quest was also demonstrated at the top in  December 1969 at the Hague 
Conference.  The Hague Communique stresses  that "the European Commu-
nities remain the original nucleus from which European unity sprang and devel-
oped"  and records  that the assembled  Heads  of  State  or Government  "have 
instructed the Ministers for Foreign Affairs to study the best way of achieving 
progress in the matter of political unification, within the context of enlargement". 
In  due  course  the  Foreign  Ministers,  basing  themselves  on  the  work  of  a 
Committee  headed  by  M.  Davignon,  Director  of  Political  Affairs  in  the 
Belgian Foreign Ministry, reported back to the Head of State or Government.1 
This document, the Davignon Report, makes a number of introductory points. 
First,  "in line  with  the spirit  of the preambles  to the Treaties  of  Paris  and 
Rome, tangible form  should be given to the will  for  a  political union which 
has  always  been  a  force  for  the  progress  of  the  European  Communities". 
Secondly, "implementation of the common policies being introduced or already 
in force requires corresponding developments in the specifically political sphere, 
so  as  to bring nearer the day when Europe can speak with one voice;  hence 
the importance  of  Europe  being  built  by  successive  stages  and  the  gradual 
development of the method and instruments best calculated to allow a common 
political course of action".  And lastly, "Europe must prepare itself to discharge 
the imperative world duties entailed by its greater cohesion and increasing role". 
To  achieve  these  purposes,  the  Ministers'  Report  continues  on,  political 
cooperation must be intensified.  ~Che Foreign Ministers should meet at least 
every  six  months  and their  meeting should be  prepared by  the heads  of  the 
political departments in their respective Ministries, themselves meeting at least 
four times a year.  If circumstances warrant it, conferences of Heads of State 
or Government should be convened. 
The Report was adopted by the Foreign Ministers at the Council meeting on 
27 October 1970. 
A  few  weeks  earlier,  on 7  October,  the  European  Parliament,  acting  on  a 
report from its Political Affairs Committee, passed a resolution on the political 
future of the European Community,2  This pointed out that "the process  of. 
economic  and  monetary  union  must  accelerate  political  unification",  and 
called  upon the  Foreign  Ministers  "to define  without delay  the role that an 
independent and democratic Europe can and must play in the world".  More 
effective machinery for cooperation, the resolution urged, should immediately 
1  Bulletin of the European Communities 11-70,  p.  9. 
2  Journal officiel C 129, 26  October 1970, p.  17. 
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be  organized.  Finally,  stress  was  laid  on  the  need  to  link  up  the  inter-
Governmental  arrangements  for  cooperation  on  foreign  policy  with  the 
Community institutions and to ensure that in any event the Commission took 
an active share in the process of  European political unification. 
In the Parliament's view, moreover, the planned cooperation should also cover 
defence and security policy. 
6.  Europe's  responsibilities 
As  already noted, the Heads of State or Government at The Hague expressed 
the resolve to prepare the way for a  united Europe capable of shouldering its 
responsibilities  in  the  world  of  the  future  and  of  making  a·  contribution 
commensurate with  its  tradition and its  task.  They laid  stress  on the part 
Europe  could  and  should  play .in  bringing  about  international  detente  and 
friendlier relations among all  peoples.  A united Europe was  essential to the 
continuance of an outstanding focus  of development, progress and culture, to 
world equilibrium and to the preservation of peace.  It is upon the development 
of the Community that Europe's place in the world really depends. 
It may  be  that Europe's responsibilities go even  beyond what was  envisaged 
by  the statesmen at The Hague.  The "crisis  of civilizat!on"  in the world of 
today,  the  protest  everywhere  against  existing  societies,  widely  though they 
may vary, the emergence of issues, newly discovered or resurrected, which cast 
doubt on man's very  reasons for living-all this  would suggest that Europe's 
mission in the decades  ahead is  taking on a new dimension.  Even were they 
fully  consummated,  the aims  of  peace,  prosperity  and material  affluence  in 
Europe are not the everything.  They are blessings which the rising generation 
takes for granted.  It demands more, far more-that they should be enjoyed 
by  all  peoples,  and especially  the poorest peoples;  that we should think not 
merely  in  terms  of standards  of  living  but of quality of life;  that above and 
beyond  even  freedom  from  hunger  and  freedom  from  war  mankind,  in 
dominating  nature  and  organizing  its  social  relationships,  should  acquire  a 
new sense of purpose, a new freshness of the spirit. 
Not  that  all  this  can  be  achieved  by  Europe  alone.  But  what  nobler 
ambitions could Europe entertain? 
Doubtless institt'ttions themselves form only a  small part of the armoury that 
will need to be deployed in the service of this task, demanding as  it will the 
commitment of all  social, economic, and cultural forces.  But political organ-
ization does appear to be a necessary stage along the way in any such direction 
and  for  that  reason  it  is  perhaps  not  going  too  far  to include  among the 
Community's tasks, in the longer or the shorter term, the assumption of a share 
in the civilizing enterprise called for by the late twentieth century. 
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The institutions  and  current  practice  in  the 
light  of the  tasks  awaiting  the  Community 
SECTION I 
THE INSTITUTIONS PROVIDED  FOR IN THE EEC  TREATY 
The instituti~nal balance created by the EEC Treaty is based on the distribution 
pf  powers  between  four  institutions:  an  Assembly  "which  shall  consist  of 
representatives  of  the  peoples  of  the  States  brought  together  in  the  Com-
munity";  a  Council,  which  "shall  consist  of  representatives  of  the  Member 
States";  a  Commission  whose  members  "shall  be  chosen  on the grounds  of 
their  general  competence  and whose  independence  is  beyond  doubt"  and  a 
Court of Justice which  "shall consist of seven  judges"  and "shall be  assisted 
by two Advocates-General"  (Art. 4,  137,  146,  157,  165  and 166  EEC). 
The authors of the EEC Treaty thus took the structure of the ECSC as  their 
basis,  though they  did  make  some  major changes  in the  roles  attributed  to 
each of the institutions and in the relationships between them. 
' 
1.  The division  of powers  between the  Council  and the Commission 
As  in the case of the ECSC, the Treaty is  applied and put into effect  by  the 
participation  of  an intergovernmental  body  in  the  power to  take  decisions. 
Under the Treaty of  Paris,  however,  it was the independent body,  the High 
Authority, which held the essential powers to act and take decisions, with the 
Council  (or  more precisely  "Special  Council  of  Ministers")  intervening  only 
in  specific  cases  by  giving  opinions,  or sometimes  assent.  In  the EEC  the 
Council became the centre of power.  It has a dual, very broadly defined role 
(Article  145).  It ensures the coordination of the  general  economic  policies, 
of the Member States and it has the power to take decisions. 
It is true that two restrictions are placed on the exercise of this power (ensuring 
that the qbjectives  set out in the Treaty are  attained in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaty), one connected with the final result, the other with the 
rule about the attribution of powers already laid down in Article 4.  But the 
general structure of the Treaty shows that as far as the application of Article 145 
is  concerned, the Council has been granted the essential normative powers for 
enacting regulations  and directives.  In  some  cases  this  power  derives  from 
relatively  precise provisions  setting objectives to be  attained, procedures  and 
final dates for the completion of the task: this is  true for most of the objectives 
set for  the transitional period and, in  this  respect,  the  Council's powers  are 
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somewhat similar  to  those  which  a  government  enjoys  for  implementing  a 
"framework  law"  (loi  cadre).  In  other  cases,  above  all  now. that  the 
transitional period is  over, the only restrictions on the Council's power are the 
requirements of a common policy which it is the Council's own task to define.1 
In  this,  the  definitive  period,  the  Council  is  therefore  the  Community's 
legislator. 
The rules  concerning majority voting in  the Council are intended to develop 
with time,  a  qualified  majority in many cases  gradually replacing unanimity, 
as, once the essential options have been taken, an increasing solidarity is  built 
up between the Member States  and a  right of  veto is  no longer justified. 
There are three sides to the Commission's role: 
1.  It  participates  in. the  Council's  legislative  powers  by  means  of  the 
proposals  which  it  submits:  the  organic  association  between  the  two 
institutions,  one  intergovernmehtal  and  the  other  independent,  is  the 
keystone of the system; 
2 .  It exercices powers granted it by the Council; 
3.  It has independent powers of authorization and of supervision over the 
Member States2 or individuals. 
The Commission is thus the driving force in the system: closely associated with 
the drawing  up  of  common policies  and with the  exercice  of the legislative 
power, it  i~.  an independent institution in its  own right as  regards supervising 
the application of the Treaty and when solutions have to be found to difficulties 
in operating the common market. 
2.  Position  and role  of the Parliament 
The  European  Parliament  has  powers  in  three  fields,  legislative  power, 
budgetary  power  and  parliamentary  control  of  the  Commission's  activities. 
A.  In  the  legislative  field,  the Parliament  operates  only  in  a  consultative 
capacity.3  In general, it is consulted by the Council on Commission proposals 
to  the  Council.  However,  the  provision  for  this  consultation  procedure 
covers by  no means all cases where the Council is  required to 'take a decision, 
1  A characteristic example can be found in Article 75  (1  c). 
2  See  Articles 73, 80, 107 and 169  of the EEC Treaty. 
3  Leaving aside the "minor revision" provided for under Article 95, third and fourth paragraphs, 
of the ECSC Treaty.  Article 235  of the EEC Treaty gives the European Parliament no power 
to take decisions. 
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even when it involves the enactment of legislation.  It is  difficult to say what 
_  was the line followed  by the authors of the Treaty on this point. 
Although the Treaty  only  assigned  a  consultative  r~le to the  Parliamentary 
Assembly, it sought to lay great' weight on the opinion delivered:  the relevant 
provision  can  be found  in  Article  149,  second  paragraph, which  states  that 
"as long as the Council has not acted (on a proposal of the Commission), the 
Commission may alter its original proposal, in particular where the Assembly 
has been consulted on that proposal". 
B.  In  the budgetary field,  apart from the right to draw up estimates of  its 
own expenditure (a  right accorded to each institution in dealing with its  own 
affairs),  Article  203  only  enabled  the  European  Parliament  to  propose 
amendments to the draft  budget  drawn up  by  the Council.  The last  word 
remains  with  the  Council.  Article  201  did  not  state  explicitly  that  the 
budgetary procedure would have to be reformed when the time came for the 
changeover  to  the  system  of  own  resources.  The  Member  States  realized, 
however, that there was  a  logical  link  between  the two operations  and that· 
once the Community was required to exist on its own income, the Parliament 
would have to have a  more important role in the budgetary procedure. 
This reform was carried out by the Treaty of 22 April1970 amending Article 203 
of the EEC  Treaty and the corresponding  Articles  of the  ECSC  and EAEC 
Treaties. 
C.  With  regard  to  parliamentary  c.ontrol  over  the  Commission,  the  EEC 
Treaty  (Art.  144)  has  the  same  arrangements  which  are  laid  down  in 
Article 24 of the Treaty of Paris for the control of the High Authority: if  the 
Commission is  to resign as  a result of a  motion of censure, there must be  an 
open vote and the motion must be supported by a two-thirds majority of the 
votes cast and a majority of the members of the Parliament. 
3.  The other Community bodies  provided for  by  the Treaties 
They  can  be  divided  into  two  kinds:  those  which  have  a  supporting  role 
alongside the four fundamental institutions, and the specialized  bodies,  some 
of which have legal personality and others which do not. 
The first group includes bodies with a wide variety of functions.  Some, such 
as  the  Committee  of Permanent  Representaives  (COREPER)  set  up  by  the 
Council in accordance with Article 151, second paragraph of the EEC  Treaty 
and confirmed by Article 4 of the Merger Treaty are working instruments for ' 
one of  the institutions.  Others  are  associated  in  an advisory  capacity  with 
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the exercise  of the power to take decisions  in  many important cases:  this  is 
true of  the  ECSC  Consultative  Committee  which  is  still  very  active  today, 
and of the EEC Economic and Social  Committee. 
The second  group contains too many bodies for them to be  listed here. 
SECTION II 
PRACTICE 
On  a  number of  points  the  Community  has  in  fact  operated in  accordance 
with the way in which functions were distributed by the Treaties-in the case 
of  the  functions  of  the  Court  of  Justice,  for  instance.  However,  the 
fundamental  institutional  balance, that of  the  central  decision-making  body, 
has undergone amendments which require analysis. 
1.  The increasing predominance  of  the  Council 
The provisions and the general philosophy of the EEC  Treaty, carrying on a 
trend which had already become visible in the ECSC, lay down that the Council 
shall be predominant in taking Community decisions.  But practice has served 
only to increase this  preponderance to such a  point that the Council,  acting 
in some instances as a Community body and in others as the States in concert, 
has become the sole ·effective  centre of power in the system.  This trend has 
certainly not had the effect of breaking the close organic connection which the 
Treaty sought to establish  between  the  Council  and the Commission-quite 
the contrary, but the collaboration between the two bodies has  been  marked 
by an increasing imbalance in favour of the Council. 
Even in carrying out the administrative tasks  proper which were  apparently 
to be its attributes, the Commission, not having been given far-reaching enough 
powers  (Art.  155),  could  not  play  its  full  part  because  in  many  cases  the 
Council wanted to  reserve  the right  to intervene  at  all  stages  of  procedure, 
down to and including that of implementation. 
The most noticeable institutional imbalance is,  however, that which concerns 
the carrying out of the general political function, whichlincludes the continuous 
exercise of legislative and executive power. 
While the Treaties, here as in other places, endorse the powers of the Council, 
they in no way exclude the Commission from this political function.  In fact, 
the opposite is true: the Commission has to participate in it through its power 
to make proposals and its role as  a  mediator. 
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Basically,  there  are  three  reasons  for  this  weakening  in  the  Commission's 
political function: 
Firstly, the practice of unanimous voting in the Council effectively deprives the 
Commission of the right granted it under Article 149 which gives  special legal 
force to its proposals; 
Secondly,  the  uncertainties,  discussions,  restrictions,·  and  in  some  cases, 
negative practices with regard to the Commission's activities  in specific fields. 
where the Member States have decided to cooperate, reduce the Commission's 
participation in the political function; 
Finally, as will  be seen below, the Commission's relations with the Parliament 
are impaired  by  the fact  that its  attention is,  for  obvious  practical reasons, 
concentrated more upon negotiating with the Council or with bodies depending 
on the Council than upon parliamentary opinion. 
2.  The substitution of unanimity for majority 
By its very nature the Council is  both a Community decision-making body and 
an institution in which the national governments can work in concert.  Since 
the institutional crisis  of 1965,  which was  brought to a  rather equivocal  end 
by the Luxembourg compromise of. January 1966, ·the  practice of unanimity 
has prevailed  in  the Council  and has  led  to the first  role  being  neglected  in 
favour of the second. 
The  compromise  records  the  agreement  of  all  the  Member  States  that,  on 
matters where a  decision that could be  taken by  majority vote on a proposal 
from the Commission  would  affect  ~ery important interests  of one  or more 
partners, the members  of  the  Council  will  endeavour to reach  a  unanimous 
decision, within a reasonable time. 
The French delegation felt,  however, that "where very important interests are 
at  stake  the  discussion  must  be  continued  until  unanimous  agreement  IS 
reached". 
This difference of opinion is  noted but not settled in the compromise. 
The consequence of this document has  been  that in practice not only France 
but  other  Member  States  too,  invoking  the  principle  of  reciprocity,  have 
referred  in  various  cases  to  the  concept  of  "very  important  interests"  and 
this  has  meant  that  the  principle  of  unanimity  has  been  generally  applied. 
But  the  problem  should  not  be  see  as  involving  simply  the  clauses· of  the 
Luxembourg compromise or its  direct  consequences.  What is  in question is 
the  practi.ce  of  votes  hardly  ever  being  taken  in  the  Council  (except . on 
budgetary  matters).  At  all  levels-experts,  Permanent  Representatives, 
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Ministers-all  procedures  except  that  of  unanimous  agreement  have  been 
rejected  in  advance,  without  any  reference  to  the importance  of  national 
interests at stake in each case. 
This practice does  not enhance the Council's power to  take decisions,  not so 
much because it prevents majority decisions, but because, in rejecting this pos-
sibility,  it  robs  discussions  of  a  stimulus  which  could  help  efforts  to bring 
together differing points of view  and leads  to a  cert<!Jn  indifference over the 
search for solutions. 
It  also  affects  the  institutional  balance.  Once  it  has  been  accepted  that 
decisions  in  Council always  require unanimous agreement, the Commission's 
proposals  lose  the privilege granted them by  Article 149  of  the EEC  Treaty. 
This has affected the Commission's activities.  The dose of innovation which 
could and normally should be included in its proposals is likely to be sacrificed 
in the search for solutions  which  will  meet  with  unanimous  approval.  The 
negotiations  which the Commission holds  with national administrations  and 
even  with the Permanent Representatives  when  it  is  working  out proposals, 
while  being  a  good  thing  in  themselves,  weaken  the  independence  of  its 
initiative.  The division of work required by the Treaties is  thus impaired. 
It should  moreover  be  realized,  that faced  with these  difficulties,  the Com-
mission  has  not  always  been  able  or willing  to  use  to the  full  the  powers 
invested in it by the Treaties.  · 
To sum up, it is  clear that there is  an increasing tendency for the Community 
decision-making  process  to  consist  of  pure,  diplomatic  style  negotiations. 
This situation arises not so much from a failure to follow the Treaties as from 
the practical  distortion of  powers  and institutions.  It would not be  untrue 
to  say  that  this  negotiating  procedure  between  seven  partners  (soon  to  be 
eleven)  plus  the  assistance  or  intervention  of  other  bodies,  the  systematic 
search for compromises  by  means  of  marathons or package deals,  is  not as 
foreign  to  collective  decision-making  as  it might ·appear.  Many equivalents 
'can  be  found  in the decision-making  processes  of  States.  No doubt...  But 
it is  quite clear from this comparison that if  the process  of concerting views, 
opinions and action is to be fully effective and achieve the best results possible, 
it must at all times be subject to the possibility of political arbitration in which 
the Pa~liament would have a real place.  Although it might not appear to be 
so, the existence of a political decision-making power does not mean there is 
no  need  for  negotiations;  on the contrary,  it  helps  to ensure  that they  will 
be successful. 
3.  New bodies  not established by the Treaties of Paris  and Rome 
Once the Community institutions  began  to function,  practice quite naturally 
gave birth to bodies for which no provision was made initially.  But it should be 
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pointed out that, in general, these new bodies have helped to tip the institutional 
balance in  the way mentioned above. 
The  Committee  of  Permanent  Representatives,  whose  establishment  was 
officially confirmed by the Merger Treaty, not orily prepares Council decisions, 
but is  also at least de  facto  if not de  jure a genuine decision-making body with 
ist  own  powers.  This  is  due  mainly  to  the  special  procedure  (commonly 
called  "A-points")  which  enables  the  Permanent  Representatives  once  they 
have  come  to  an  agreement  between  themselves  and  with  the  Commission, 
to propose that the  Council  should  adopt a  decision  without discussion  on 
matters not of major importance but often of some substance.  The existence 
of  the  Committee  of  Permanent  Representatives  and  the  practices  followed, 
mean  that  the  Commission  holds  talks  in  most  cases  with  diplomatic 
representatives  of  the  Member States  whose  roles  are  further  enhanced  by 
their rank and personal quality. 
In  connection  with  administrative  matters,  the  Management  Committees 
properly  so  called  should  be  mentioned.  These  are  intergovernmental 
technical bodies  with a Chairman provided by  the Commission whose task is 
to assist the Commission in operating certain common policies,  in  particular 
the  agricultural policy.  In  this  way,  in  cases  where the  Council  confers  on 
the Commission implementing powers  under Article  155  of the EEC Treaty, 
the Council provides the Commission with highly valuable technical assistance 
without in fact encroaching upon its powers of decision, since the Council has 
only limited possibilities of intervention and has very rarely used them. 
On the other hand, the Commission does not enjoy the same freedom of action 
under the rules  of procedure of the regular committees  because in the event 
of disagreement between the Commission and such a committee, the Council is 
called on to arbitrate between them. 
More significance  should probably  be  attached to the appearance and proli- . 
feration  of  bodies  in  which  the  Governments  work  together  and  which 
jeopardize the unity of the Comm'unity institutions in fields  important for the 
future.  If the Commission were to be pushed to one side or made to play a 
minor role, this would presage "a Europe of bits and pieces". 
Finally and in another respect the appearance at the highest level  of a de  facto 
organ which will probably have an essential role to play for the future of the 
construction of Europe:  the Summit Conference,  should be  welcomed.  This 
practice is the one most likely to provide the major developments and the new 
fields  of action for  the Community, not to speak of the action which all  too 
often  has to  be  taken to break the  logjams  which  occur through the faulty 
working of the Community institutions. 
Paradoxically the problem raised  by  the Summits is  not that of the political 
will  of the States,. as  expressed in the solemn resolutions,  but that of giving 
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effect to these resolutions.  The impression sometimes prevails that the inter-
governmental  bodies  of  lower  rank,  which  in  principle  have  to  see  to 
implementation,  do  not  feel  as  intensely  as  might  be  expected  the  political 
will  expressed  at  top  level.  Experience  seems  to  show  that by  making  the 
Community institutions responsible for putting into effect the decisions taken 
at the Summits, progress would be  more rapid and more direct. 
4.  The life  of the European Parliament 
As  the authors of the Treaties were interested more in the construction than 
the government of Europe, they did not give the Parliament a very important 
place among the Community institutions, no doubt thinking that the matter 
would have to be reviewed when the time came: hence the legal and political 
ambiguity of the European Parliament's position. · 
From a  sociological  rather than legal  point of view,  it can be  seen  that the 
Parliament  is  to  no  small  degree  democratically  representative.  The  major 
political  groups  of  the  member  countries  are  present.  In  addition  to  this 
they  are  to  no  small  extent  grouped  together  at  European  level,  although 
certain gaps  exist and some uncertainty is  being  caused-by the arrival of the 
new  countries  which-in  particular  Britain- have  original  party  systems. 
But if  Parliament is  representative,  it also  works  in a· vacuum.  Its  debates 
-and  other work and the tensions  which  arise  and which  bear witness  to its 
nature as  a  political institution, have  almost no impact on the press,  public 
opinion  and  the  life  of  the  political  parties.  The Parliament  thus  falls  far 
short of fulfilling its normal tasks of expressing and shaping political opinion. 
This state of affairs can be explained basically by its limited powers. 
Parliament has powers to take decisions,  limited powers to be sure,  only on 
budgetary matters and in connection with the "minor revision"  of the ECSC 
Treaty.  In one way it is  also a victim of the institutional imbalance referred 
to above,  because  the role  of the  Commission,  the  body  over  which it  has 
some power, has  become much less  important than that of the Council, with 
which political communication is  much less direct.  Its consultative function is 
impaired by the fact  that, although the Commission seeks the support of the 
Parliament, it enters into negotiations with the Council, even before submitting 
its formal proposals  to  the latter.  It  is  always  difficult for a  parliamentary 
body  to  be  associated  with  negotiations,  even  in  a  consultative  capacity. 
Sometimes, when faced with an implicit prior agreement between the Commis-
sion  and  the  Council,  the  Parliament  feels  that  its  opinion  can  be  of  no 
substantial significance. 
Admittedly, the technical quality of its work and on a political plane, the links 
its  members have with public opinion in the various countries, may give  the 
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Parliament  a  genuine  hearing  in the  Council.  But  this  is  not so  much  an 
institutional arrangement as  a practice which can become intermittent. 
There should  be no  illusions  about the Parliament's  budgetary  power,  even 
after being strengthened by _the  Treaty of  22  April 1970.  In the Community-
as in the States, the budget, in the main, does nothing more than put figures to 
decisions· taken "upstream".  It is  in their capacity as  legislators  much more 
than  as  budgetary  authorities  that  the  national  parliaments  control  public 
finances.  As  it does  not form a legislature, the European Parliament can do · 
·no  more than check the sums for almost all sections of the budget. 
Fortunately, the exercise of the power of  control by  the Parliament over the 
Commission has· never yet taken the form  of a  censure  motion.  This is  no 
doubt proof of  the agreement  between  the two  institutions  and the  quality 
of the Commission's activity.  Even  more welcome is  the dialogue involving 
both  trust  and  criticism  which  has  grown  up  between  the two institutions 
through the committees and the written questions procedure.  It must, however, 
be  recognized that in these processes of control and dialogue, the main party 
concerned, the Council, is  absent, despite attempts made to associate it with 
the work, attempts which in fact have not always met with its resistance. 
It would scarcely  be  possible,  without undermining the very  foundations  of 
institutional  balance,  to  establish  a  process  of control  giving  the European 
Parliament a power of sanction over the Council, whose member.s are politically 
responsible before their own national Parliaments.  It is,  however, debatable 
whether  all  possibilities  of  procedures,  involving  questions  and  answers, 
explanations, and in brief, dialogue and communication, have been explored. 
It is  true that some of the problems  mentioned could  be  solved through the 
relationships  between the European Parliament and the national Parliameuts. 
By  a  sort of coming and going  between the European Parliament  and their 
national Parliament, Members of the European Parliament could build a bridge 
between  national  democracy  and  Community democracy.  The obstacles  to 
be overcome are however formidable: the fact that it is difficult for parliamentar-
ians to be equally active in national political life and Community political life; 
the fact that political careers have at present as their normal setting domestic 
institutions and rivalries. 
All in all, the role of the Assembly is  something less than that of a parliament 
and  Community  decisions  acquire  democratic  legitimacy  almost  exclusively 
through national channels. 
As has already been said, this result does not conflict with what was laid down 
in the Treaties and in particular in the EEC Treaty.  But as  is  shown by the 
mandate  of  the  Working  Party,  the  real  question  is  whether  the  European 
Parliament should not be strengthened in the years ahead in the interest of both 
the construction and the government of Europe. 
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5.  Overall view  of the general· trends  of  the  system 
In the last fifteen  years  Community practice  has  developed  along two lines. 
The first concerns the Community itself, its fields  of action, its  achievements, 
ii:s  progress, its promises.  On the whole, it is  satisfactory and in the light of 
some forecasts  which  did  not always  come from  opponents  of the Treaties, 
it is even surprising. 
The second line of development concerns the Community institutions, and it calls 
for more reservations.  The nature of  these  institutions  has  been  somewhat 
distorted.  Not only has the intergovernmental character of the Council been 
accentuated, but this feature has been passed on to bodies at a lower level in 
the Community and has spread to the machinery which tends to be built up 
around it.  The Commission  has  not  been directly  affected  by  this  process, 
but there is a danger that restrictions on its role will reduce it to administrative 
if not technocratic functions. 
More  generally;  there  has  been  a  certain  decline  in  the  political  role  of 
the Community institutions, including the Council.  Everything would seem to 
indicate that the political initiatives which will be increasingly necessary in years 
ahead are no longer being taken by Community bodies and that when they are 
held up, they can only set in motion again from outside, by top level interven-
tion, but, if Summit Conferences  are not to be  drepeciated, they should only 
be called to settle very important problems. 
It is true that not all items in this  account are negative and that this or that 
drawback mentioned may sometimes be accompanied by an advantage.  This 
is true for example of the interpenetration between the national governmental 
and  administrative  structures  on  the  one  hand  and  the  similar  European 
structures on the other and of the human relations  built up  by the practices 
of negotiation and compromise.  It is questionable, however, whether this sort 
of sociological integration, which is  inevitably very. slow, would be adequate 
to meet the multifarious tasks  awaiting the Community and the States which 
are already Members or are about to join. 
Finally, the terms of reference required that consideration should be  given to 
the position that the European Parliament should occupy; the problem arises 
here not only of democracy but also of effectiveness, insofar as  the parliamen-
tary instrument can, admittedly not alone but in concert with other instruments, 
palliate the deficiencies of the system which has been broadly outlined above. 
SECTION III 
ADAPTING TO THE FUTURE 
Where the EEC Treaty was concerned with the gradual establishment of the 
customs  union during  the  period  of  transition,  provisions  were  often  made 
s.  4/72  31 The institutions and current practice in the light of the tasks awaiting the:Community 
down to the last detail for the rules to be applied, the stages to be accomplished 
and the procedures to be followed.  · 
In this  field  the institutional  system  has  in general  functioned  satisfactorily, 
but not as  well in fields  (e.g.  implementation of the various common policies 
and harmonization  of  legislation)  for  which  the  Treaty set the  Community 
in  very  general  terms  the  task  of  taking  initiatives  itself  on  the  basis  of 
certain principles and for the purpose of attaining certain objectives. 
Now that the transitional period is  past, the accent is  placed fully  on these 
tasks of creation and on the exercise of the wide discretionary powers which 
the treaty  ~onfers on the Community to this end.  The common policy in the 
various sectors for which explicit provision is  made and the harmonization of 
legislation required by the Treaty on many points must be expanded, pursued 
and regulary adapted to the constantly changing circumstances and concepts  . 
. New Community tasks implicitly laid down in the Treaty or expressly added 
by  the  governments  themselves  must  be  accomplished.  But from  the  point 
of view both of democracy and of efficacy the existing complex of instrumentali-
ties does not seem capable of adequately fulfilling the tasks ahead.  Measures 
. must be taken to strengthen the institutional system so that it can accomplish 
these tasks. 
1.  What is  necessary  from the  point of view  of democracy 
If it is  to accomplish the tasks awaiting it now that the transitional period is 
over,  the Community  needs  to find  its  own democratic  legitimation  beyond 
that which can be transmitted to it by the governments responsible.  The n·~ed 
for this legitimation increases with the scope of the tasks. 
Firstly, the largely discretionary powers explicitly or implicitly contained in the 
Treaties can be extended only with the support of political and social forces. 
These forces can normally make themselves heard in t4e European Parliament. 
The whole range of nationalities, social interests and political convictions exist-
ing  in  the  Community  is  represented  there.  It  is  in  this  setting,  at  once 
Community and parliamentary, that the necessary support should  be  sought 
and can be found. 
Secondly it must be  realized  that, as  the  Community extends its  powers, the 
national parliaments at the same time lose legal and de  facto  powers. 
In  carrying  out the tasks  which  it  is  set,  the  Community  exercises  powers 
which hitherto usually belonged in a national context to the parliament or to 
the parliament and government acting together.  Community laws and levies 
replace national laws  and taxes.  In the final  analysis,  Community directives 
make  the  national  parliaments  nothing  more  than  chambers  for  recording 
decisions. 
32  s.  4/72 The institutions and current practice ih  the light of the tasks awaiting the Community 
In the Community this  power to make laws,  raise taxes and issue directives, 
which has become of central importance once the transitional period is ended, 
is  in the hands of the Council,  assisted  by  the Commission.  Through their 
representatives  in  the  Council,  the  national  governments  enjoy  considerable 
possibilities  of  intervening  in  the  process  of  drawing  up  decisions.  The 
collective  nature  of  this  process  and  the  irrevocable  character  of  the 
resultant decisions do, however, impede the effective control which the various 
national parliaments could exercise over the part played by each of the govern-
ments in this  process.  Any  attempts to establish an effective  control of this 
kind  would  involve  a  danger  of  the  national  parliaments  binding  the 
governments by instructions given in advance; this would make the search for 
agreement within the Council even  more difficult and more laborious than it 
IS now. 
The national parliaments are consequently deprived  of  an increasing part of 
their powers whose exercise by the collectivity of the governments represented 
in  the  Council  now  in  fact  escapes  in  the  main  from· their  control.  The 
logic  of  a  democratic  system  would  require  that this  loss  of  parliamentary 
power at national level  should be compensated at the European level. 
Finally, it should be  stressed that as  a result of the extension of powers, the 
"European interest" covers increasingly large sectors of the economic and social 
life of the member countries.  To reach decisions, reconciliation of interests is 
required  and  in  future  this  will  be  as  much  between  sectoral  as  between· 
national  interests,  e.g.  to  find  an acceptable  and  justified  balance  between 
industry  and  agriculture,  between  progress  and  the  environment,  between 
monetary stability and better living standards.  Experience shows that if such 
reconciliation of interests is  to succeed it requires  an effort to concert views 
which is  complex and free  of inequalities.  The European Parliament is  the 
institution  par  excellence  in  which  views  could  be  concerted.  If, as  is  the 
case in the present system, this duty fell  almost entirely to the Council, there 
would be  a  danger of seeing  conflicts  between sectoral interests  transformed 
into conflicts  between national interests.  The consequences of this could be 
difficulties  in carrying out the reconciliation of interests and results might be 
produced which would meet with strong resistance from many quarters because 
of their unbalanced and unstable character.  In the long run this situation can 
be avoided only by calling on the European Parliament, modified if need be, 
in its· operation and composition.  By  ensuring that there is  a wide consensus 
in the complex system of tensions, democracy is thus reunited with effectiveness. 
2.  What is  necessary  from  the point of view  of  efficacy 
A.  As regards the objectives 
An effort to find  new approaches is  required for progress to be  achieved in 
Community action.  To this  end each institution must make its  own specific 
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contribution.  The effort of creative imagination must come if not exclusively, 
at least  substantially,  from  the  Commission.  As  an  institution independent 
of the governments  and  politically  responsible  to  the  European Parliament, 
the Commission  is  in  a  position  which  allows  it  to consider  the  European 
interest in the long term, so that it can obtain an overall view of the policy to 
be followed and can play a role as initiator, planner and mediator for the common 
good.  A combination of two of its features-its political experience and its 
technical capacity-·  enable it to grasp the links between Community activities 
and technical requirements. 
These Community activities must have the support of public opinion, which must 
be  both  expressed  and prompted by  a  representative  body.  The European 
Parliament can be the sounding board and stimulator of this  public opinion. 
Without prejudice to its capacity as an innovator, the Council ensures that the 
centres of national political authority will  accept Community actions and that 
these  actions  conform  with  the  realities  of  the  varied  political,  social  and 
administrative life of the peoples joined together in the Community. 
A rational balance between these elements is  indispensable for drawing up the 
Community actions and for their success.  The fault with the present system, 
in which the importance of the Council far exceeds that the of other two institu-
tions,  is  not  the  position  occupied  by  the  Council,  but  the  weakening  or 
fading away of its partners: 
The defence of national short-term interests prevails over long-term forecasts 
in which they would,  in  most cases,  coincide with the Community interests. 
Sometimes  nothing  is  decided,  as  if  conservatism  were  triumphing . over 
imagination.  The cohesion which must exist between the Community's various 
activities  is  frequently forgotten  because there is  no  overall view  of a  policy 
to be followed.  Public opinion is not committed.  At least it is indifferent or 
only appears in protest.  Europe has its "silent majority"; like the others, it is 
largely ineffective. 
· The dominant position occupied by  the Council also  leaves  its  stamp on the 
institutional development of the Community.  Where this development proceeds 
from a single pole, the importance of this pole tends to be accentuated and there 
is an increase in the imbalance resulting from it.  · 
B.  As regards the means 
For  economic  and  monetary  union  to  be  established,  with  all  that  this 
implies, there must be machinery for taking decisions which is  better fitted for 
finding  the  elements  of  Community  solutions,  determining  compensatory 
measures  and  acting  with  the  speed  required  in  monetary  matters.  This 
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decision-making  machinery  must fit  into the Community institutional  system 
in such a way that better links with other Community decisions are guaranteed. 
Community  funds  will  be  necessary  as  the  means  for  supporting  new 
Community actions.  The use of these funds will become the expression of a 
policy.  Such a  policy can be justified and have a chance of succeeding only 
if it has  been  worked out on the basis  of  an agreement  and therefore of  a 
dynamic dialogue between all the institutions. 
The extension of the Community's powers involves large-scale projects such as, 
for  example,  regional  policy.  For  these. projects,  standards  must  be  fixed 
within which the Community can act.  The Parliament must have its say when it 
comes to fixing these normative frameworks. 
The  impending  increase  in  the  number  of  members  of  the  Council  will 
probably exacerbate certain  problems.  It has  been  seen  that the automatic 
and at times nonchalant search for unanimity leads the Council into jams and 
deadlock.  It is  not the Council's uncontested right to make decisions  which 
is  in question here.  It is  its  capacity to take decisions  and its responsibility 
for these decisions.  The real  problem is  not caused  by the Council refusing 
or  amending  Commission  proposals,  but  by  the  fact  that  these  proposals 
become  hopelessly  stuck in  minor procedures or are  subject to  silent inertia 
which  dilute  responsibilities  and  discourage  initiatives.  With  this  situation · 
prevailing,  the  arrival  of  new  countries  in  the  Council  would  increase  the 
number of disappointments if the problem were not tackled frankly and freely. 
It will  be seen  that solutions  are hard to find  and that there is  no  panacea; 
but at least something will have to be done. 
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The increase in the powers of the Parliament 
SECTION I 
THE  NEED  TO  REINFORCE  THE DEMOCRATIC  ELEMENT  IN  THE 
COMMUNITY 
In  the  preceding  chapters,  some  of  the  reasons  why  the  powers  of  the 
European parliamentary institution must be strengthened have been mentioned 
at various points. 
As  already stated, the processes of democratic legitimation are far from absent 
from the structures and mechanisms set up by the treaties.  But in the main, 
these processes  are only indirectly connected with the Community since they 
are  derived  from  the  national  parliaments  and  take  place  via  the  national 
governments.  It is  only to a  minor extent, in limited fields  and with limited 
powers, that the Assembly intervenes as a true parliament. 
The new assignments,  arising from the economic  and monetary union to be 
realized in t'P.e  near future,  call for  an extension of the Parliament's powers. 
This is  because the development of the Community's fields  of operation and 
powers involves  transfer to the Community bodies  of  powers which,  on the 
national plane,  belong  wh~lly or partly to  the parliaments.  The growth of 
the  Community's  powers  must  not  result  in  a  reduction  of  parliamentary 
powers.  Even  if  the  straight  forward  transposition  of the  system  of  the 
distribution  of  powers  found  in  national  systems  (which  in  any  case  varies 
from  country  to country)  simply  transposed into the Community system,  is 
not at present fully possible or desirable, the losses of power by national parlia-
ments must be compensated. 
It may indeed  be  asked if  this  necessity,  plain enough from the  democratic 
point of view, is equally plain from the point of view of efficacy.  It would be 
idle to deny that the entry into Community life  of a Parliament with greater 
powers  might,  in  a  way,  complicate the institutional mechanism  and at the 
worst cause further bottlenecks. 
These fears  can be overcome.  The suggestions below take the fullest account 
of the dangers just pointed out.  But above all, it should be emphasized that 
strengthening the role of the Parliament will fill up not only a sort of democratic 
vacuum but also certain gaps in the efficient working of the Community. 
In  this  respect  it  should  be  observed  that  the  Parliament  is  the  only 
Community institution where  the parliamentary oppositions  of  the Member 
States are represented.  High on the list of essential structures, both from the 
practical and the legal point of view, is  an opposition which is  not only per-
36  s.  4/72 The increase in the powers of the Parliament 
mitted  but  is  considered  to  be  a  key  element  in  the  constitutional  system. 
It is one of the firmest tenets. of modern political theory. 
Certain discussions  on basic  problems  have  no  real  significance  unless  they 
engage  both  majority  and  opposition.  This  is  particularly  the  case  with 
discussions  concerning the structures  and  meaning  of  modern  societies,  for 
example the relationship  between quantity  and quality,  the balance  between 
industrial growth and the quality of life, environmental problems, consumer pro-
tection, the control of monopolistic undertakings, regional policy and federal 
or decentralized democracy. 
It  is  often  in the  parliaments,  where  the  worries  of  day-to-day  policy  and 
administration  are  less  inhibiting  than  they  are  in  the  governments,  that 
imagination,  creater of social  innovations, not to say  inventions,  can give  of 
its best. 
There is  therefore no general  and inevitable conflict between the demand of 
democracy and the need for efficiency.  Both must be satisfied.  This is  what 
we shall try to do in the following pages. 
SECTION II 
THE INCREASE  OF LEGISLATIVE  POWERS 
1.  Principles 
Reasons will be given  below (Chapter V)  why it is  neither vital nor desirable 
to make the increase of the European Parliament's powers dependent on its 
election by direct universal suffrage. 
Moreover, the Parliament's powers have undergone a first increase without its 
waiting  for  a  change  in  its  method  of  recruitment  since  the  Treaty  of 
Luxembourg  of  22  April  1970  gave  it  greater  budgetary  powers.  These 
powers  are~ however,  limited  by  the fact  that the  most  important items  of 
expenditure are governed rigidly  by decisions on which the Parliament can at 
b.est,  do no more than give its advice. 
In theory it might  be  thought that the extension  of  the Parliament's powers 
follows  from  the  idea  that it should  play  a  leading  role  in  all  that can be 
described as community legislation. 
Such  a  theory would not tally  with the general  philosophy  of  the Treaties. 
The Treaties do not reproduce  at Community level  the distinction generally 
made  by  national  constitutions  between  the  legislature  and  the  executive. 
According  to the  original  constitution of  the Community,  the  Council is  its 
legislature.  We could not s.ubstitute  the  Parliament .for  the  Council in this 
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role without attacking the very roots of the Treaties.  So  any increase of the 
Parliament's powers would have to be achieved not through replacing one body 
·by another but  through  a  system  enabling  the Parliament  to participate  in 
law-making decisions.  It can be seen that this participation by the Parliament 
can develop from  a  simple consultative role irito  a  real  power of codecision 
based on the Parliament's ability to accept or reject Council de-cisions. 
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that there is  no general clause in the 
Treaties which defines  the power of each institution.  The Council's and the 
Commission's powers are explicitly allocated for specified fields  and there is  a 
list  of the cases  in which the Parliament must  be  consulted.  Consequently, 
the solutions put forward must, in accordance with the Treaties, define case 
by case the increased powers considered desirable. 
In addition, this examination will have to conform to certain general criteria. 
Despite  the  usefulness  of  the  idea  that  the  Parliament's  powers  should  be 
increased  systematically  by  reference  to  cases  where  the  Parliament  has  a 
consultative role under present law, the Working Party did not believe that this 
idea could be adopted, at least as a principle.  Clearly it would have been simpler 
to decide that, in such cases, the Parliament ought to be  given  a  more active 
part capable of leading to a power of codecision, whereas in those fields where 
the  Parliament  at  present  plays  no  role,  not  even  a  consultative  one,  this 
exclusion should continue. 
An  approach  such  as  this  would  have  seriously  misinterpreted  the  actual 
situation.  For one thing, there are cases where consultation of the Parliament 
is  provided  for  by  the  Treaties,  although  these  are  not  cases  involving 
fundamental  problems,  bearing  in  mind  that  the  questions  concerned  are 
often largely answered beforehand by  the terms of the Treaties.  On the basis 
of these hypotheses, there is  no need to give the Parliament more than a  con-
sultative role, while strengthening and improving the consultative procedures. 
On the other hand, there are cases where no provision has been made even for 
consultation of the Parliament,  but which concern matters whose importance 
will grow as the Community develops, especially because of the economic and 
monetary  union  (see,  for  example,  art.  103  §  2  of  the  EEC  Treaty). 
Accordingly,  consideration  should  be  given  to  whether  the  Parliament's 
intervention  should  not  be  recommended  in  these  cases,  either  by  way  of 
consultation or by way of codecision. 
A further consideration should be borne in mind.  The Community lays down 
plans  and programmes  guiding its  future  activities, in the  more  or less  long 
term.  The documents concerned do not,  strictly speaking, involve legislative 
decisions creating binding obligations, but they are nevertheless of considerable 
political importance.  Here, too, the European Parliament ought to be heard, 
at least in a  consultative capacity. 
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Finally,  the Parliament's  preliminary intervention obviously cannot extend to 
all special or urgent decisions which have to be taken from day to day or in a 
hurry,  under  a  common  short-term  economic  policy  or a  monetary  policy. 
Moreover,  national  constitutional  laws  do  not,  in  general,  provide  for 
parliamentary participation in working out  su~h decisions.  Parliament plays 
its part by ex post facto control. 
These are the criteria taken for delimiting the fields in which extension of the 
powers of  the Parliament is  envisaged as  set out below. 
2.  Fields  and stages  of  extension  of the powers  of  the Parliament 
From the very beginning, the Community, in order to define the ways and means 
of its development, has often resorted to the system of programmes whose parts 
were to be implemented in various stages.  The resolution:of 22  March 1971 
concerning  the  economic  and  monetary  union  recently  made  use  of  this 
method.  The  Working  Party  considered  it  would  be  advisable  to  have 
recourse to it in order to implement the proposals put:forward here. 
In this  context, the Working Party recommends that the law-making powers 
of the Parliament should be increased in two stages.  Apart from the problem 
of political timing which would be raised by  the need for the consent of the 
Member  States  to  a  broad  and  very  rapid  expansion  of  the  Parliament's 
powers,  a  transitional  period  should be foreseen  in  the course  of  which the 
Community institutions  would adapt steadily and by  trial and error, each in 
its  own field  and in its  relations  to the  others,  to the new  system  which  is 
recommended. 
In the first stage, Parliament would be given a power of codecision (according 
to  the procedures set  out under § 4 below)  in the following  matters,  which, 
for simplicity's sake, are hereinafter called list A: 
revision of the Treaties; 
implementation of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty and analogous provisions 
in the ECSC and Euratom Treaties; 
admission of new members; 
ratification  of  international  agreements  concluded  by  the  Community. 
Besides this and still in the first stage the European Parliament would be given 
· a  greater power of consultation consisting in the right to ask  the Council to 
reconsider  a  subject  and  hence  a  suspensive  veto  in  the  following  fields 
(called list B  }: 
EEC  TREATY 
Article 43  (common agricultural policy); 
Article 54 § 3, g (guarantees required of firms}; 
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Article 56 (special treatment for foreign nationals); 
Article 57 (diplomas and self-employed occupations); 
Article 75  (common transport policy); 
Article 84 (sea and air transport); 
Article 87 (competition); 
Article 99 (harmonization of tax systems); 
Article 100 (harmonization of laws); 
Article 103  § 2  (conjunctural policy); 
Article 113  (comq10n commercial policy); 
Article 126 (European Social Fund); 
Article 128  (vocational training). 
EAEC  TREATY 
Article 31  (basic standards for protection of health); 
Article 76 (adapting chapter VI on supplies); 
Article  85  (adapting  the  methods  of  safety  control  laid  down  in 
chapter VII); 
Article  90  (adapting  chapter  VIII  on the  Community's  property  rights 
over special fissionable materials). 
MERGER  TREATY 
Article 24 (service regulations of officials). 
In  the  second  stage,  the  Parliament  would  be  given  a  power  of  codecision 
according to the procedures set out under § 4  below, in all- matters in list B; 
naturally, it would continue to exercise its  power of codecision in all matters 
in list A. 
It is  necessary briefly to explain, in the light of the principles described -above, 
how the matters in list A  and list B were selected. 
List A,  as  already stated, contains the matters which are to be subject to the 
Parliament's power of codecision from the first stage onwards. 
It  covers questions  which  materially  involve  either  the  Community's  con-
stitutive power or its relations with other persons in international law. 
The  involvement  in  the  constitutive  power  appears  clearly  in  relation  to 
Articles 236 EEC, 204 EAEC, 96 ECSC, concerning amendments to the Treaties. 
In § 4, below, the proposal is  made that the Parliament should be given the 
same  power  of  codecision  as  regards  Articles  201  EEC  and  173  EAEC, 
concerning the Community's own resources.  On the other hand, it does  not 
seem that the simplified procedures which, in certain cases, enable very specific 
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points in the Treaties to be adapted or amended to a limited extent {e.g. Art. 81 
ECSC)  can  be  regarded  as  involving  constitutive power.  It is  in fact  rather 
more a  legislative  power,  as  may  be  seen  from  certain  items  in list  B,  dealt 
with above. 
It is  true that amendment of  the Treaties, in  accordance with Article 236  of 
the EEC  Treaty and analogous  articles  presupposes  democratic endorsement 
since ratification in accordance with the constitutional rules  of each Member 
State  implies  approval  by  the  national  parliaments.  However,  it  is  highly 
desirable that the Community's own constituent process should make provision 
for  like  approval  by  the  European  Parliament,  which  is  the  democratic 
institution of the Community as ·such.  In this way, the amendment procedure 
would assume its  full  meaning:  approval of the amendment by the Assembly 
would set  the seal  of  the  Community's Parliament on the  texts  adopted  by 
the Council in pursuance of the proposal made below (§ 4), before the national 
parliaments  are  called  upon to  speak  and  this  would  undoubtedly  make  it 
easier for them to give their assent. 
The procedure under Articles 235  of the EEC Treaty, 203 of the EAEC Treaty, 
and 95  § 1  of the ECSC  Treaty, which must be  dealt with further in a  later 
chapter, is  "para-constituent", if  one can  use  such  a  term.  As  we  know, it 
applies to those cases in which Community authorities take "appropriate steps" 
to implement a  measure necessary for the functioning of the common market 
without  the  Treaty  having  expressly  provided  the. powers  for  doing  so. 
Article 235  will  certainly  become more and more important as  the economic 
and monetary union progresses.  In any case,  this article contains provisions 
which affect  Community tasks and instruments and have a  definite influence 
on the rights  of Member States:  this  justifies  the inclusion  of  Article  235  in 
list  A.  The  Parliament  will  thus  be  able  to  contribute  to  the  dynamic 
implementation of this text. 
Intervention by  the Parliament, via  the  process  of  ratification, in agreements 
concluded by the Community with persons in international law is in accordance 
with  the  constitutional  laws  of  Member  States  which  require  international 
agreements  concluded  by  governmental  authorities  to  be  approved  by  the 
elected  Assemblies  in  one  way  or  another.  {Also  in  accordance  with 
constitutional practice in  most Member States, an exemption must clearly be 
made  in the  case  of  technical  and  administrative  agreements  which  do  not 
presuppose such intervention).  It will be seen that the international agreements 
which  would thus  be  submitted  to the  European Parliament for  ratification 
would include  the  association  agreements  referred  to in  Articles  238  of  the 
EEC Treaty and 206 of the EAEC Treaty. 
Finally,  the  entry  of  new  members  into  the  Community  affects  both  the 
constituent power and international agreements.  This justifies the Parliament's 
intervention in the procedure referred to under Articles 237 of the EEC Treaty, 
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205 of the EAEC Treaty and 98  of the ECSC Treaty, not only as a consultative 
body  but also  to  give  its  approval  to  the  Council's  unanimous  decision  to 
admit new members. 
It would appear that the Parliament needs to have the power of co-decision 
in the four matters just described from the first stage onwards.  The Working 
Party  did  not deem it  essential  that Articles  138  of  the EEC Treaty, 108  of 
the EAEC  Treaty and 21  of the ECSC  Treaty should  be  included in list  A, 
since  the present text already associates the Parliament closely  with the task 
of achieving election  by  direct  universal  suffrage and in  practice the Council 
would find  it very  difficult  to  adopt provisions  which  met with determined 
opposition from the European Parliament. 
List  B  above  concerns  matters  regarding  which,  during  an  initial  stage,  a 
strengthened  consultative  role  would  be  conferred  upon  the  Parliament  in 
the  shape of a  suspensive veto  and which,  during a  second stage,  would be 
subject to the exercise of a power of co-decision on the part of the Parliament. 
According to the Treaties, most of these matters already have to be discussed 
with  the  Parliament;  but  others  are  exempt  from  any  such  compulsory 
consultation procedure.  (Arts.  84,  103  § 2,  113  and 128  of the EEC Treaty). 
In fact-apart from  Article  24  of the Merger  Treaty  (status  of  Community 
officials), which, for obvious special reasons, is included in list B-the matters 
in list B come under one of the two groups described below. 
Firstly,  there  are  measures  for  harmonization  of  legislation  which  have 
important effects on national laws and which therefore call for the intervention 
of a parliamentary body at Community level: take, for example, harmonization 
measures  concerning~ notably,  the  practice  of the  liberal  professions.  This 
group  covers  those  matters  referred  to  in  Articles  54  §  3  g,  56,  57,  99  and 
100 of the EEC Treaty. 
Secondly, there are the questions of principle affecting common policies, which 
may  also  involve  harmonization  measures.  Since  they  are  fundamental 
measures determining one or other common policy, their importance in the life 
of  the  Community  and  the  obligations  they  impose  upon  Member  States 
justify the strengthening ·of  the Parliament's consultative role during the first 
stage and its power of co-decision during the second.  This is  so with matters 
referred to in Articles  43,  75,  84,  87,  103  § 2,  113,  126 and 128  of the EEC 
Treaty. 
In  both groups, preliminary intervention by the Parliament does  not concern 
implementation measures, which, depending on their nature, will fall to either 
the  Council  or  the  Commission  and  could  be  amenable  only  to  control  a 
posteriori. 
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It  will  be  seen  that circumstances  may  bring  about  inclusion  in  the list  in 
question  of  matters  which,  until  now,  have  not  appeared  to  require  such 
inclusion.  For  example,  Articles  49  and  51  of  the  EEC  Treaty  concerning 
the status of workers have not been included in the above proposals so as  not 
to burden them with  matters  in which the tasks of the Community seem  to 
have  been  defined  quite  precisely  by  the  EEC  Treaty.  One  can,  however, 
imagine political situations arising in which the implementation of Articles 49 
and 51 call for their inclusion in list B.  Similarly, implementation of a common 
regional  policy  would result  in Article  94  of  the  EEC  Treaty being included 
in that list. 
3.  Fixing  the  timetable 
· The first stage mentioned above will, of necessity, begin when the amendments 
to the Treaties, which should result in an extension of the Parliament's powers, 
come into force.  In  Chapter VIII  we  shall  see  that, as  a general  rule,  these 
amendments are legally necessary if  some of the proposed objectives are to be 
achieved,  although, on certain points, concerted practice between the Council 
and the Parliament may  become  an accepted  part of  relations  between them 
in anticipation of such formal amendments to the Treaties. 
As  regards  the second stage, the Working Party asked itself whether it should 
be realized in a  single step according to a prearranged timetable. 
A majority of the Working Party adopted the view that it should.  It considers 
that the second stage should begin with full legal effect at a date prescribed in 
the treaty  of revision.  It also  believes that this method of  fixing  a  timetable 
had already proved its  worth and that, with due regard to the attractions of 
gradualness, it prevents any dilatory attitude. 
It is  true that it  is  difficult for the Working Party to propose a  date for  the 
completion of  the second stage, since this  will largely depend on the progress 
made in developing the Community, particularly in respect of the economic and 
monetary  union.  Bearing  this  in  mind,  it  might  be  considered  that  the 
beginning of the second stage could not be  delayed  beyond 1978. 
One member of the Working Party was of the opinion that  a:  much simpler 
system which could be more easily implemented would be simply to lay down 
for the second stage a procedure for  agreement  between the Council  and the 
Parliament  which,  without any  predetermined timetable, would progressively 
subject matters in list B to the Parliament's power of co-decision. 
Conversely, two members  of  the Working Party consider that in view  of the 
urgent need to increase the Parliament's normative powers and the time-:limits 
required by the procedure for  revising the Treaties, a power of co-decision in 
matters of  common policy should be  conferred upon the Parliament from the 
outset. 
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4.  Procedures  for  the  participation  of the  Parliament 
For the sake of clarity,  mention must be made of the different possible ways 
in which the Parliament might participate in the first or second stage mentioned 
above:  · 
A.  Co-decision,  consultation and suspensive  veto  during  the  first  stage 
1.  During the initial stage the power of co-decision can be exercised in four 
distinct cases  (list  A).  The procedures  envisaged  for  each  of them  must be 
explained: 
a)  Revision of the Treaty · 
Article 236  of the EEC Treaty (204  of the EAEC Treaty and 96  of the ECSC 
Treaty)  makes  provision  for  several  procedural  phases  for  revising  the 
Treaty:  a proposal made by a  government or by  the Commission; a  Council 
opinion in favour of calling a conference of the representatives of the Member 
States  (after  consultation  with  the  Parliament  and  where  appropriate,  the 
Commission);  convening  of  the  conference  by  the President  of  the  Council; 
determination by  the conference of the amendments to  be made; ratification 
of these amendments by the Member States in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements. 
Article  201  of  the  EEC  Treaty  {173  EAEC)  concerns  a  change  of  a  quasi-
constitutional character in the Community rules on the precise point of replacing 
the financial  contributions  of  the  Member States  by  the  Community's  own 
resources.  The procedure is  appreciably simpler than that under Article· 236 
of the EEC Treaty since amendment merely presupposes, on a proposal from 
the Commission and after consultation of the Parliament, a unanimous Council 
decision  whose provisions  are submitted to  the Member States for adoption . 
in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 
The mode of revising the Treaties could be based upon the procedure referred 
to in Article 201, which has the advantage of being simpler since it does not 
include the holding of a  conference of  representatives  of  the Member States, 
which, moreover, as  experience shows, has  a formal character.  Furthermore, 
the  power  of  co-decision  of  the  Parliament  would  naturally  fit  into  this 
procedure. 
Thus,  the revision  of the Treaties  (Arts.  236  of  the EEC  Treaty, 204 of the 
EAEC  Treaty  and  96  of  the ECSC  Treaty),  as  well  as  the  very  important 
decision referred to in Articles  201  of the EEC  Treaty and 173  of the EAEC 
Treaty,  would be  carried out according to the following  uniform procedure: 
44  s.  4/72 The increase in the powers of the Parliament 
Proposal  from  the governments  or the  Commission  (Arts.  236  of  the 
EEC Treaty, 204 of the EAEC Treaty and 96 of the ECSC Treaty) or from 
the  Commission  alone  (Atts.  201  of the  EEC  Treaty  and  173  of  the 
.EAEC Treaty); 
Consultation of the Parliament; 
Unanimous  Council  decision  on  revlSlon  or decision  (Arts.  201  of the 
EEC Treaty and 173  of the EAEC Treaty); 
Approval of the Council decision by the Parliament; 
Ratification of the revision or adoption of the decision (Arts.  201  of the 
EEC  Treaty  and  173  of  the  EAEC  Treaty)  by  the  Member  States  in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 
b)  Implementation  of  Article  235  of  the  EEC  Treaty  (203  of  the  EAEC 
Treaty and 95,  paragraph 1 of the ECSC Treaty) 
Implementation of  Article  235  of  the EEC  Treaty assumes  that the Council, 
on  a  proposal  from  the  Commission  and  after  consulting  the  Parliament, 
takes  the appropriate decisions  to give the Community the powers necessary 
for the functioning of the common market, despite the fact that these powers 
have not been expressly provided for in the Treaty.  From the first stage, the 
Council  decision  could  take  effect  only  after  approval  by  the  Parliament. 
Here the functioning of the co-decision procedure would need to be governed 
by the same rules as  those that will be detailed below in respect of the power 
of co-decision in general (under B below). 
c)  Admission of new members 
Beginning  with the initial  stage,  the  power  of  co-decision  conferred  in this 
matter upon the Parliament would result in the Council decision  to  admit a 
new State requesting  membership  of  the  Community ·(Arts  237  of  the EEC 
Treaty, 205 of the EAEC Treaty a~d 98  of the ECSC Treaty) taking effect only 
after approval by the Parliament.  In addition, it would be advisable to make 
provision for the Parliament, like the Commission, to be consulted even before 
the  Council  takes  its  decisions.  This  would  be  logical  nad,  furthermore, 
would facilitate implementation of the procedure. 
d)  International agreements concluded by the Community 
The procedures provided for in the Treaties vary according to the case at hand 
as  regards both the participation of the various institutions and the rules  on 
majority or unanimous voting in the Council (Arts.  113  and 238  of the EEC 
Treaty and 101  of the EAEC Treaty). 
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Two common rules should be adopted: 
The Parliament  must  always___ be  consulted  before  the  initiation  of  any 
international negotiations;  , 
Any  international agreement concluded cannot come into force without 
being approved by the Parliament. 
2.  Consultation of the Parliament during the initial stage takes place in one 
of three possible ways: First, in list A, independently of the power of co-decision, 
then for matters in list  B,  where it is  accompanied by  a  suspensive veto  and 
finally,  for  matters  not included  in  either  list  but for  which  consultation  is 
already provided for in the Treaties. 
Procedural questions concerning the suspensive veto  will  be  dealt with below 
(3.).  For  the  moment,  we  will  look  only  at what concerns the consultation 
itself. 
The procedure followed  at  the  moment  is  not without its  drawbacks.  For 
example,  in  law  at  least,  Commission  proposals  are  submitted  to  the 
Parliament  only  upon a  Council decision;  the  Parliament is  not always  kept 
well  informed of  the  amendments,  the  Commission  may  be  led  to  make to 
its  proposals following  dealings  with  the  working parties, the Committee of 
Permanent  Representatives  or  the  Council  and  it  is  not  always  given  the 
opportunity to put forward its  own views  on amendments  which  are  never-
theless  essential to the initial proposals. 
Doubtless, it is  of  no use  to consider amendments to the Treaties in order to 
bring- about the desirable improvements on this point. 
In  fact in the past, satisfactory practices  have been introduced by  agreement 
between  the  institutions.  Similar  procedures  might  enable  further  progress 
to be made in improving consultation of the Parliament. 
First of all,  one could go  further than the practice whereby the Parliament i_s 
"informed" of proposals submitted to the Council  by  the Commission.  The 
Council would merely  have to duplicate this  unofficial practice by  an official 
and  automatic  one  of  reference  to  the  Parliament  which  would  already 
integrate it into the institutional procedure. 
Secondly, if  once an opinion ·has been delivered  by  the Parliament, the Com-
mission  proposal  is  considerably  changed  as  a  result  of  contacts  with  the 
Council, the Committee of Permanent Representatives or the working parties, 
the Parliament should be informed of this and be able to render a new opinion. 
Thirdly, if  the  Council deviates  appreciably  from the opinion  received from 
the  Parliament,  it  would  be  desirable  that  it  should  justify  this  decision  in 
detail.  Although it has always maintained that it need not reply to questions 
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on this  point, or has  had recourse  to  purely  laconic  and formal  replies, the 
Council has, in  certain cases,  explained its  attitude. 
Finally, the situation in which decisions  are prejudged by  groups of Council 
experts before the Parliament has delivered  its  opinion should be avoided as 
far as possible. 
3.  The suspensive veto that could be exercised by the Parliament in matters 
in list B during the initial stage would result from the right to ask the Council 
for a second deliberation. 
Without prejudice to the  preliminary  consultation- mentioned  above  (2.),  the 
Council  should  refer  to  the  Parliament  any  decision  taken  on  matters  in 
list  B.  Implementation  of  the  decision  would  be  delayed  until  deliberation. 
by the Parliament, which should take place within one month, at the end of 
which, in the absence of such deliberation, the Council decision would come into 
force.  If,  within  this  period  of  one  month,  the  Parliament,  proceeding  in 
accordance with Article 144 of the EEC Treaty, asks the Council for a second 
deliberation,  the  Council  must  comply  with  this  request  and  take  a  new 
decision having a definitive and enforceable character.  So as not to complicate 
the procedure unduly, the Parliament would always be able to announce that 
it was dispensing with the period of one month referred to above and that it 
agreed to immediate implementation of the Council decision. 
It will  be noticed that this  procedure would be superimposed on that under 
Article 149 of the EEC Treaty without, however, taking anything away from it. 
This  would  not  adversely  affect  the  role  conferred  by  this  text  upon  the 
Commission, whose position should never,  as  a general rule,  be weakened by 
new powers granted to the Parliament. 
B.  Co-decision during the second stage 
During the second stage, the power to use a suspensive veto that was granted 
to the Parliament during the first stage is transformed into a  genuine power of 
co-decision. 
There is  no reason why this power of co-decision exercised at the final stage 
of the procedure should not allow the consultation ·of the Parliament at the 
beginning  of  the  procedure  to  continue  in  the  terms  referred  to  above. 
Preliminary  consultation  of  the Parliament on Commission  proposals would 
make it easier for the power of co-decision to be exercised in a  harmonious 
manner.  Knowing that approval by  the Parliament determines the decision-
making  process,  the  Commission  and  the  Council  would  find  it  in  their 
interests  to  be  informed  in  good  time  of  the  Parliament's  point  of  view. 
Furthermore, the Parliament may propose, in advance, amendments to the draft 
text  .. 
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The power of co-decision would mean that a Council decision could not come 
into  force  without  being  approved  by  the  Parliament.  There is  reason for 
hoping that, in most cases, the concerted tripartite action resulting, as  has just 
been explained, from consultation of the Parliament, will lead to a positive vote. 
If, however, the Parliament refuses to give its  approval, the Council, in order 
to  reach  a  decision,  would  have  to  reconsider  the  matter  and  resume 
negotiations with the Parliament. 
It has occasionally been proposed that a mediating committee be entrusted with 
the task of settling difficulties  which  divide the Council and the Parliament. 
However, it must be admitted that such  mediation is  a  natural  task for  the 
Commission.  On the basis of Article 149 of the EEC Treaty, the Commission 
will have to inform the Council of any modified proposal likely,  this time, to 
be approved by the Parliament. 
Should one go even further and accept that, in the case of persistent divergences, 
the definitive  decision  could, after a  certain period,  be  taken in disregard of 
the  opposition  of  the  Council  or  of  the  Parliament,  so  that  Commission 
proposals that had been approved by  one of the other two institutions could 
be successfully implemented?  This idea must be ruled out as  being contrary 
to the concept of co-decision which is  to be put into general practice during 
the second period.  One cannot seriously propose the short-circuiting of  the 
Council,  even  in  exceptional  circumstances,  as  this  would  throw  overboard 
one of the basic elements of the Treaties, or of the Parliament, since it would 
mean  taking away  with one hand the power of co-decision  just given  with 
the other. 
Two members of the Working Party, however, would like to see the Parliament 
taking  its  vote  before  the  Council  in  order to  overcome  the deadlock..  If, 
within a year, the Council did not take any decision, this would be tantamount 
to approval.  In this  case, it could be  imagined that the proposal should be 
given  a  second  reading  in  Parliament  before  adoption.  The two  members 
who are of this opinion believe that this would make it very unlikely that the· 
Council  would  systematically  give  negative  replies,  given  the  difficulty  of 
reaching  a  unanimous  "no" and that, instead,  it would  be  more likely  that 
there would be instituted a system of reference back and forth (  navette) between 
the Council and the Parliament. 
5.  The legislative  initiative  of the  Parliament 
The Parliament is  already  able to  propose initiatives  affecting  legislation  by 
means  of  resolutions  requesting  the  other  institutions  of  the  Community, 
especially the Commission, to take action. 
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It does not seem to be advisable to transform this de. facto facility into a formal 
power of legislative initiative.  It is  in the Commission that the Treaties vest 
the role of initiator and promoter of Community norms.  So as not to endanger 
this  prerogative,  conferred  on  the  Commission for  the  benefit  of the Com-
munity interest, it would be much better to retain the flexible practice which 
in  fact  allows  the  Parliament  to  propose  initiatives  in  the  legislative  field: 
moreover  the  efficacy  of  this  practice  can  only  be  strengthened  when  the 
Assembly accedes to full  parliamentary status. 
6.  Scope  of activity  of  the legislative  function 
In principle, the Parliament is  to participate in the normative procedure in the 
above-mentioned  fields  when  the  decisions  concerned  are  similar  to  those 
regarded  by  national  laws  as  normally  being  of a  legislative  nature.  ·They 
are theref()re important decisions, especially in that they modify the legal order 
of the Community or of the Member States. 
If the Parliament wished to have a say in the mass of measures of application, 
its work would be overloaded by tasks of secondary importance, which would 
adversely  affect the degree  of  attention which it .should give  to fundamental 
or important  decisions.  The  legislative  system  in force  in  the  Community 
already includes a system of "framework laws" (lois-cadres) laying down rules 
of principle, the detailed implementation of which is  left to the Council or to 
the Commission.  Extension of the Parliament's powers should not adversely 
affect this sensible practice. 
Ir, truth, there is  no general formula that can be used to find the exact border 
between the two types of norms just mentioned and of which only one requires 
the  participation  of  the  Parliament,  subject  to  ex  post facto  control.  The 
distinction  will  become  clearer  with  practice.  Decisions  submitted  to  the 
Parliament for approval should include express authorization for the Council 
or the Commission to adopt the implementing measures. 
As  for  the conditions  under  which  the Parliament  'Yill  be  able  to  exercise 
an ex post facto control on the way in which the Commission or the Council 
carries out this task, they are linked with the general problem of parliamentary 
control, which will be discussed later.  ', 
7.  Early  implementation of proposed measures 
As  we  have  remarked,  even  before the proposed reforms  are legally  ratified 
by amendment of the Treaties a  significant number of them could in fact be 
implemented  by  an  agreement  between  the  Parliament  and  the  other  two 
institutions  and  come  into  force  within  the  shortest  possible  period  (cf. 
chapter VIII). 
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SECTION III 
PARTICIPATION OF THE PARLIAMENT IN THE FORMULATION OF 
ECONOMIC POLICY,  PLANS  AND PROGRAMMES 
Quite  often the  Community  institutions,  using  recommendations  and decla-
rations, have made use of the system of programmes for preparing and shaping 
future  Community  policies  in  different  sectors  and  thus  prejudging  future 
Community  legislation.  On  three  occasions,  for  example,  in  1967,  1969 
and  1971,1  the  Council  has  formulated  medium-term  economic  policy  pro-
grammes  which  lay  down  certain  guidelines  for  the  economic  policy  to  be 
pursued  by the  Member  States.  These  measures  are  not  binding  but their 
implications can, in fact, be far-reaching.  · 
Once economic and monetary union is  achieved, this process of laying down 
guidelines will assume increasing importance (cf. resolution of 22 March 1971). 
It goes  without  saying  that, from  the  first  stage,  the  Parliament  should  be 
consulted when these plans or programmes are being formulated. 
In principle, the non-compulsory character of these plans and programmes is 
not necessarily a reason for the Parliament's powers  of intervention going as 
far as co-decision in a  matter in which the character of  decision is  precisely 
lacking. 
In certain cases, however, the programmes may not be purely indicative ones. 
The  Council  decision  of  22  March  19712  concerning  the  strengthening · of 
co-ordination  of  the  Member  States'  short-term  economic  policies  provides 
that the Council may, in one of its three annual deliberations  on short-term 
economic policy, lay down guidelines for the national budgets before these have 
been finally approved. 
These  guidelines  have  at  least  a  de  facto  determining  influence  on  the 
legislation  and  the  financial  decisions  of  the  Community  and  the  Member 
States. 
If for  the  moment  the  practice  of  programmes  and  plans  enables  us  to  be 
satisfied with the purely consultative role of the Parliament, the possibility must 
not be excluded of this practice evolving in the direction of a genuine normative 
power in respect  of  these  programmes  and  plans.  In  this  eventuality,  the 
Parliament's power of co-decision recognized during the second stage would 
have to be extended accordingly. 
1  journal  officiel 79,  25  April  1967,  p.  1513.  Ibid.  L  129,  30  May  1969, p.  1.  Ibid.  L 49, 
1 March 1971, p. 1. 
2  journal officiel L 73, 27 March 1971, p.  12. 
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SECTION  IV 
BUDGETING AND FINANCIAL  POWERS  OF THE PARLIAMENT 
1.  The Community budget and its impact 
The whole course of  economic and social policy followed in the Community 
countries, whether under common policies, in co-ordination or independently, 
is  carried out through both the budgets of the Member States and the budget 
of the Community. 
Although  Community  expenditure  looks  at first  sight  to  be  impressive  (the 
1972  estimates  work out at roughly  4,000  million  u.a.),  it represents  in fact 
quite  a  small  item  in  public  expenditure  as  a  whole  namely  1%  of  all  the 
national incomes taken together, whereas in the budgets of the Member States, 
the corresponding. percentage is  twenty or thirty times higher. 
The great  hulk of  it is  accounted for by  expenditure in connection with the 
common agricultural  policy,  with  EAGGF  alone  accounting for  90%.  Very 
much  smaller  amounts  go  in  social  expenditure  (1%  for  the  Social  Fund, 
though its  share may well  be increased later)  and in expenditure on Euratom 
capital and research projects (1.5% ). 
Though the impact of Community operations on the national budgets is  not 
always easy to detect, let alone quantify, it undoubtedly exists.  It is  small in 
scale as  yet,  but will  necessarily  increase with the progress  of  economic and 
monetary union and the framing of Community policies on industry, research, 
energy, the environment and regional development.  Even where these policies 
are aided by  Community appropriations, more particularly through the various 
Funds it is  intended to set up, they will have the effect of inducing additional 
expenditure  in  the  national  budget  of  Member  countries.  Thus, the  Com-
munity's budget will only partly reflect the financial implications of its policies 
on the economic and social side. 
Accordingly,  it  would  be  both democratic  and  useful  to  develop  a  practice 
recently  approved  by  the  Council  for  the  drawing-up  of  annual,  and  in 
particular of pluriannual, Community estimates.1 
The  scope  of  these  should  be  extended  to  provide  data  in  regard  to  the 
budgeting  impact  of  Community  policies  in  the  national  as  well  as  in  the 
Community context.  The preparation of the estimates should be the occasion 
for concerted action between Council, Commission and European Parliament, 
which could thus form an overall  picture of the economic and social policy 
pursued and/or promoted by  the  Community.  This  procedure is  politically 
and  economically  a  more  important  affair  than  drawing  up  a  budget  in 
1  Council Decision of 21  April 1970, journal officiel L 94, 28  April 1970, p. 23. 
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isolation.  It  will  incidentally  fit  into  place  amongst  the  assortment  of 
procedures whie>h will grow up for governing and managing the economic and 
monetary union. 
This  is  an  aspect  fundamental  to the whole  parliamentary  function,  which 
includes  participation by  the Assembly  in the determination of the medium-
and long-term guidelines for all Community policy, whose financial implications 
are reflected in the Community and national budgets.! 
2.  The limits  of budgeting power 
Power to establish a budget is not co-extensive with power to take the economic 
and social policy  decisions  which govern the budget.  Thus the expenditure 
of the Guarantee Section  of EAGGF,  which  accounts  for  far  and away  the 
largest slice  of Community expenditure as  a whole, flows  automatically from 
the Council's prior decisions on agricultural prices.  Even where not automatic 
to quite the same extent, expenditure from the Community budget is primarily 
dictated  by  earlier  Council  decisions  fixing  maximum or minimum levels  or 
authorizing  the  Commission  to  appropriate  specific  amounts  for  specific 
purposes. 
Correspondingly,  the  revenue  of  the  Community  is  likewise  automatic  and 
indeed obligatory.  It consists for the most part of the agricultural levies, plus, 
from 1975  on, all  duties charged at the frontiers  of the customs union.  The 
third  source  of  Community revenue  after  1975,  namely  the maximum  "one 
poin:t"  of the harmonized V.A.T.,  will  be  in some  measure aiutomatic as  to 
its  total,  since  to  balance  the  budget  this  total  must  meet  that portion  of 
expenditure which is  not covered  by  the agricultural levies  and the customs 
duties.  Should the maximum proportion of the V.A.T. yield set aside for the 
Community, prove insufficient for this purpose, either that proportion would 
have to be  increased or new  taxes  would have to  be imposed, which  under 
Article 2  (2)  of the decision of  21  April 1970  in conjunction with Article 201 
EEC  or  Article  173  Euratom,  would  necessitate  a  special  Council  decision 
and  endorsement by the Member States  in  accordance  with  their respective 
constitutional requirements.  As  noted earlier in connection with Article 201 
EEC and 173  Euratom, it is  necessary that, from the first stage referred to in 
Section II, Council decisions taken under the provisions just mentioned should 
come into force only after receiving the approval of the European Parliament. 
All  in  all,  then,  the  budgetary  power and  the power of financial  decision-
making in the broad sense do not coincide.  On the face of it no doubt this 
is also the case at national level, where generally speaking there is much rigidity 
in  budgeting  inasmuch  as  the  bulk  of  budget  expenditure  is  governed  by 
I  Cf.  Section III  above. 
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situations and decisions predating the presentation and passage of the budget, 
so that, whether in law or in fact, the role of the Parliament, as the ultimate 
legal controller of the budget, is  much reduced.  But even though at national 
level the Parliament's budgeting powers are thus curbed, at least it is the maker 
or part-maker  of  the  original  decisions  underlying  the  constraints  upon it. 
Under the Community system on the other hand the automatisms and rigidities 
of the budgeting process are, as the law now stands, imposed by decisions on 
which the Parliament has been merely  consulted, if  that.  Only by giving the 
Parliament a greater say in legislation can this anomaly be corrected. 
3.  The budgetary power of the European Parliament 
Since there is  the gap between the budgetary. power properly so-called and the 
power of taking decisions with financial implications, it is understandable that 
the Treaty of 22 April 1970, although investing the Parliament with the power 
of adopting the budget from 1975  onwards, does not give it the last word on 
"expenditure  necessarily  resulting from  the  Treaty  or from  acts  adopted in 
accordance therewith".  Only in respect of expenditure not of this  kind can 
the Parliament's wishes override the Council's. 
The phrase just quoted is  far from clear.  The Council, acting on a classification 
contained  in  an  unpublished  document,  construes  it  as  meaning  that  the 
Parliament has the last word only on expenditure the basis of which is to be 
found  exclusively .in  the  budget  itself-i.e. only the heads  of  administrative 
expenditure and a few items of operating expenditure.1 
If this construction is the right one,  i~ limits the right of the Parliament to have 
the last word on no more than 3-4%  of total Community expenditure.z 
However,  it  is  possible to construe the phrase in  question in  a  sense  more 
favourable  to  the  Parliament's  budgeting  powers,  namely  that "expenditure 
necessarily  resulting  from  the  Treaty  or  from  acts  adopted  in  accordance 
therewith" means only expenditure of which the amount is already fixed when 
the budget Is  adopted or results auto'matically from  an·  existing arrangement 
(e.g.  the Guarantee Section of EAGGF). 
1  The declaration  annexed to the  Treaty of  22  April  1970 _(see  "Les ressources propres aux 
Communautes europeennes et les  pouvoirs budgetaires du Parlement europeen", published by 
the European Parliament, 1970, p. 204)  notes that the  Council "has based itself on the  classifi-
cation of budget expenditure as exemplified in the list established by the Chair on 3 February 1970, 
while  accepting  that this  classification  may  change  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of 
the operation of the Communities". 
2  Over 80%  of administrative expenditure is fixed and rigid, being of a "necessarily resulting" 
class  (staff  salaries,  rental  and  maintenance  of  premises,  telephone  charges  and  so  on) 
(cf.  Spenale Report, European Parliament doc. 42/1970-71, sees.  36 and 42, reproduced in the 
publication referred to in the above footnote, pp. 171  and 172). 
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On this reading, the Parliament would be entitled-subject to the quantitative 
limits  set  on increases  in  Community  expenditure  by  Articles  203  (8)  EEC, 
177 Euratom and 78 ECSC-to vote with final power of decision, appropriations 
in respect of expenditure not provided for by prior Council decision and also 
increases  or reductions  in appropriations  already  budgeted for,  so  long  as  it 
observed minima or maxinia fixed by prior Council decisions. 
It is true that such appropriations made available by the Parliament on its own 
initiative would have to be expended for purposes falling within the competence 
of the Community and more precisely  within the powers and responsibilities 
of  a  Community  institution.  Generally  speaking,  the  Council,  unless  it 
objected for policy  reasons,  could find  legal  warrant in the Treaty-notably 
in Article 235 EEC-for using the funds in question in the manner desired by 
the Parliament.  The Commission-in a way, the natural institution to manage 
and utilize appropriations-could be given the necessary authorization by the 
Council to do so. 
Two  members  of  the  Working  Party  consider  that  an  increase  in  the 
independent financial  resources  will  be  inevitable  for  the  implementation  of 
new Community policies to ensure a  more effective and complete solution for 
problems  of  Community  dimensions  than  any  which  can  be  provided  by 
national action.  They propose that the choice of sectors for new Community 
interventions be decided by a qualified majority of the Parliament in a debate 
having as its object the determination of pluriannual programmes defining the 
use of the whole or of  a substontial part of the new resources thus placed at 
the disposal of the Community. 
4.  The real problem 
The Parliament strongly defends the idea that Article 203(6)  confers on it from 
1975 the right "at the end of the proceedings and in case of serious objection, 
to reject the whole draft budget in order to secure fresh budgetary proposals"  .1 
This interpretation is  shared by  the Commission and in the form of motions, 
by two national parliaments, but despite the stress laid on it by the Parliament, 
it is  not shared by the Council. 
The Working Party does not have to reach a decision on this controversy.  It 
must, however, express its doubts on the possibility, by a refusal of the budget 
en  bloc, of advancing the cause of parliamentary participation in Community 
decisions,  particularly in legislative  matters.  By  its  very  nature a  prolonged 
institutional crisis  resulting,  should  the  occasion  arise,  from  such  a  refusal 
1  Resolutions  of  11  March  1970,  5,  and  13  May  1970,  10-cf. Spenale report,  European 
Parliament,  Doc.  42/1970-71,  reproduced  in  the  publication  mentioned  in  the footnote  to 
pp. 160, 168 and 189. 
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would endanger the still  precarious progress of Community activities  and its 
outcome would perhaps not be attended by the s'!ccess desired by the Parliament. 
The proper way to present the problem of the participation of the Parliament 
in Community policy is  to co11sider  that, for the reasons given above, purely 
budgetary powers are a  weak  means  of influence.  The direct  attribution of 
a  power of  co-decision  in  legislative  matters,  outlined  above,  is  much  more 
decisive and it is  this reform which, by  contrast, will give real significance to 
the budgetary power of the Parliament. 
Since  the  Parliament  will  exercise  a  power of co-decision  in the acts  which 
are at the basis  of  Community expenditure and will  be  associated  with the 
establishment  of  pluriannual  estimates,  it  will  share  with  the  Council  the 
financial  responsibility  resulting therefrom.  As  soon as  these  powers are in 
the hands of the Parliament, the hiatus between the budgetary power and the 
other  powers-particularly  the  legislative  powers-will  disappear.  It  will 
then be  necessary  to eliminate the distinction between the two categories  of 
expenditure mentioned above and to give the Parliament a power of co-decision 
on the  budget  as  a  whole  equal to that which it will  then  be  exercising in 
legislative matters. 
5.  Control of  the  budget 
The Treaty of 22 April1970 partially adapted control by the Parliament of the 
execution of the budget to the new powers it will exercise from 1975  regarding 
its establishment.  The new Article 206(4)  provides that the  Council and the 
Assembly must jointly give discharge for execution to the Commission. 
It seems quite  logi~al that the Parliament should also receive,  by assimilation, 
a  power of  co-decision in two cases  closely  connected with the execution of 
the  budget:  the  authorization  of  expenses  exceeding  the  provisional  one-
twelfth  (Art.  204 EEC)  and the elaboration of the financial  texts  mentioned 
in Article 209 (a, b, c). 
SECTION  V 
RELATIONS  BETWEEN  COMMUNITY LAW  AND NATIONAL  LAW 
Whereas,  under EEC  Article  189,  a  regulation ·is  binding in all  respects  and 
directly applicable in all Member States, a directive, whieh is  addressed to the 
States according to the same provisions, is binding only with regard to the result 
to  be  achieved  and  leaves  the  decision  on  ways  and  means  to  national 
authorities. 
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In certain matters, principally concerning the harmonization of legislation, the 
directive alone is  open to the Community.  This is  not without disadvantages 
in  matters  in which,  for  technical  reasons,  harmonization  means  that Com-
munity institutions  must go  into considerable  detail,  and where a  regulation 
would consequently seem  more appropriate.  It is  true that some directives, 
in order to cope with this difficulty, have taken the form of very detailed texts, 
which  solves  part of the problem,  but surprises  the  national legislator,  who 
wonders what is  left of  the power over ways  and means  which the directive 
should, in theory, leave to him. 
Consideration  could  be  given_,  if  not  to  the  elimination  of  any  distinction 
between regulations and directives, then at least to a considerable broadening 
of  the  possibility  of  using  regulations.  The  granting  to  the  Parliament  of 
powers of co-decision such as  those which have been proposed would justify 
this approach by nullifying the argument that the regulation mutilates national 
legislative  power.  In  fact,· in  a  system  where  the  European  Parliament  is 
associated  with  the  elaboration  of  the  most  important  regulations,  taking 
powers from the national parliaments is  much less shocking than if it were done 
solely to increase the powers of the Council.  Valid as  they are, the technical 
considerations just put forward concerning the frequent disadvantages of the 
distinction between regulations and directives do not appear to justify for the 
moment  the  abolition  of  this  distinction  or  an  extension  of  the  field  of 
application of regulations, which could be felt, rightly or wrongly, as ah assault 
on the legislative powers of the national parliaments.  On this point, time will 
do  its  work:  the  practice  of  co-decision  will  remove  the  prejudices  against 
Community  legislative  power  and  its  most  advanced  form,  the  regulation. 
The development of Community powers under the auspices of EEC Ardcle 235 
will  have  the  effect  of  progressively  extending  the  field  of  application  of 
regulations. 
SECTION VI 
THE PARLIAMENT'S  POWERS  OF CONTROL 
The  extension  of  the  powers  of  the  Parliament  does  not  only  concern  the 
exercise of the normative function, but also that of the control which, under 
democratic systems, is  one of the fundamental tasks of the Parliament. 
1.  Utilization  of parliamentary procedures 
The Parliament has endeavoured to strengthen its  powers of control vis-a-vis 
the Commission and to develop its  relations with the Council.  To this end, 
the most varied procedures have been employed, notably parliamentary questions 
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(very  often  of  great  interest)  and  calling  for  written  or  oral  replies  (EEC 
Art. 140, Arts. 45 to 47 of the standing orders of the Parliament).  It has already 
been said that the Council has agreed in some cases to make known the reasons 
why a decision taken by it diverges  appreciably from the opinion rendered by 
the Parliament.  It has even agreed to present a report to the latter from time 
to  time  through  the  medium  of  its  President.  These  practices  should  be 
pursued and developed. 
The Parliament's committees  already  have  real importance which is  'destined 
to increase in the future.  By  multiplying  relationships with the  other institu-
tions,  they  can  exercise  a  closer  control.  The  specialization  and technical 
competence of their members  enable them to play  an important part in the 
elaboration of programmes and plans and to supervise their execution.  Finally, 
they are in a position to institute very desirable cooperation with the national 
parliaments (Cf.  Chapter VI). 
All these procedures, which are a part of parliamentary techniques, will develop 
and become consolidated as  the Parliament acquires new powers, particularly 
powers of  co-decision.  The history of parliaments shows that as  soon as. a 
parliament  begins  to  play  a  real  part in  the  legislative  process,  it  assumes 
ipso facto  an authority and an influence which guarantee it the power to watch 
over  the  government's  actions  and .  to  demand  the  supply  of  all  necessary 
information. 
There does not, therefore, seem to be any point in proposing a revision of the 
Treaties  to endow the European Parliament  with  a  power of  control since, 
for the reasons already mentioned, the sanction of this control, organized vis-a-
vis  the Commission by EEC Article 144, cannot extend as  far as the Council. 
In fact, the Parliament, armed with new powers, notably in the legislative field, 
will be able to keep itself informed, to judge, and even to warn. 
2.  Relations  of the  Parliament with the  Council 
The absence of any system of Council responsibility to the Parliament is a basic 
datum of the Treaties and is  implicit in the very  composition of the Council, 
which is  made up  of national Ministers.  On the other hand, the system does 
not exclude the development  and consolidation  of a  practice of information 
and control already initiated  (§  1 above),  the need for which  must  again  be 
stressed. 
Similarly, as  already mentioned, it would be desirable that the Council give a 
clear explanation of the reasons for  not following  the opinion of  Parliament 
in any given decision.  It would be imprudent to go further by arranging, for 
example,  that  there  should  be  general  and  systematic  publication  of  the 
Council's  deliberations,  since  such  a  measure  would  probably  impede  the 
formation of a consensus in that body. 
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SECTION VII 
THE INVESTITURE  OF THE PRESIDENT  OF THE COMMISSION 
Curiously enough, the Treaties which give the Assembly the power to overthrow 
the Commission do not provide for its  interVention in  the nomination of its 
members which is  decided only by agreement of the Member States (Art. 11  of 
the merger Treaty). 
The nomination of members of the Commission by the Parliament cannot be 
envisaged.  The institutional  relationships  between  the  Commission  and the 
Council and the Commission's position with regard to the national governments 
necessitate,  for  the  very  maintenance  of  its  authority,  that  its  members  be 
chosen by the governments.  · 
It  could, however,  be  conceiv(;':d  that the· Parliament  should  receive  a  power 
of  co-decision in this  matter too.  This would be  normal and logical,  would 
have  the advantage  of  stressing the political importance of the Commission, 
and would perhaps orientate the choices  of governments towards outstanding 
political personalities. 
In order to achieve this result, it is  not necessary or even useful to submit for 
the approbation of the Parliament the entire list of Commission members drawn 
up  by  the governments.  In  view  of the difficult  balances  which govern the 
composition of the Commission, the Parliament would find  it difficult put to 
exercise the power theoretically attributed to it. 
On the other hand, the intervention of  the Parliament would doubtle:;s  have 
more impact if it took the form of approval of the governments' choice of the 
President  of the  Commission.  That would give  greater political  importance 
both to the office and to the person chosen. 
In  addition,  the  President  invested  should  be  consulted  by  the  governments 
on the appointment of the other members and, strengthened by his dual inves-
titure-governmental and parliamentary-would be able to see that a genuine 
team was formed. 
The system of the parliamentary investiture of the President of the Commission 
would thus have consequences going far beyond the simple legal result of the 
system, particularly  by  giving the choice of President a political character, by 
providing a solid basis for his authority and by giving him a say in the formation 
of the Commission.  This is clearly an instance where the criteria of democracy 
and effectiveness coincide completely. 
The results expected would no doubt be even better if the President's mandate 
were extended from two to four years. 
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SECTION  I 
THE  REJECTION  OF  ANY  PRECONDITION  FOR  THE  INCREASE 
OF POWERS 
Article 138(3)  of the EEC Treaty provides that: 
"The Assembly shall draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage 
in accordance with a  uniform procedure in  all  Member States.  · 
The Council shall,  acting  unanimously,  lay  down the appropriate provisions, 
which it shall recommend to Member States for  adoption in  accordance with 
their respective constitutional requirements." 
Although the European  Parliame.nt  implemented the first  part  of  the  above 
provisions  twelve  years  ago  by  working  out  and  adopting  a  draft  making 
election  by direct universal  suffrage possible, the Council has  refrained from 
taking up a position and has thus prevented further progress. 
There is a widely held view that the powers of the European Parliament cannot 
be increased  until the provisions  of Article  138  have  been  carried  out, since 
application  of  the  Treaty  should  logically  precede  its  revision.  Moreover, 
from a political point of view the exercise of new and increased powers would 
require that the members of the Parliament be chosen directly by the people. 
Election  of  the  Parliament  by  direct  universal  suffrage  would  therefore 
constitute a precondition for any increase of its powers. 
The  Working  Party  has  plainly  and  emphatically  opposed  this  assumed 
precondition, for various reasons. 
First of all, the system of the precondition, because of a logical trap, leads to a 
vicious circle.  For if one cannot imagine a Parliament with real powers which 
does  not  draw  its  mandate  from  direct  universal  suffrage,  it  is  even  more 
difficult  to  imagine  the  election  through  direct  universal  suffrage  of  a 
Parliament  without  extended  powers.  In  this  way,  two  equally  desirable 
objectives are making each other's implementation impossible.  The only way 
to break the vicious circle is  to refuse to let one of the two objectives depend 
on the achievement of the other one first.  Neither has priority over the other, 
nor  is  their  simultaneous  achievement- necessary.  If any  logical  links  exist 
between them, these are expressed in the fact that any progress made towards 
achievement of one will be a step towards achievement of the other.  Moreover, 
experience has shown that, even without its recruitment procedure having been 
changed,  the European Parliament  has  managed to  acquire  new  and legally 
important budgetary powers. 
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If, furthermore, the powers of the Parliament were increased in the way proposed 
in  the  previous  Chapter,  these  powers  would  in  themselves  endow  the 
Assembly  with sufficient  prestige  to  attract  a  good  many  influential  parlia-
mentarians from the Community's Member States who would be prepared to 
work for the introduction of direct election.  The new powers would, of their 
very nature, constitute means of influencing events in such a way as to promote 
the application of Article 138  of the EEC Treaty.  , 
Finally,  although  it  is  desirable  that  the  provisions  of  this  article  be 
implemented as  soon as  possible, it should be noted that the present mode of 
recruiting of the Parliament involves a certain degree of democratic legitimacy 
justifying the exercise of true parliamentary powers. 
For these reasons, the assumed precondition of  Article  138  must be rejected. 
One should also dismiss a second precondition arising from the prospect of a 
possible reform of the distribution of seats in the European Parliament.  The 
present distribution system,  resulting from  Article  138(2)  of  the EEC Treaty 
and from  the Accession  Treaty, produces,  on  otherwise  reasonable grounds, 
an unequal representation relative to populations and if universal suffrage were 
introduced, to the various European constituencies. 
This inequality in representation, which is only of minor importance as long as 
the Parliament plays  a  mainly  consultative role,  might present a  problem  in 
the eyes  of some people from the moment the Parliamentreceived real powers 
of decision-making,  even  if  these were only limited powers.  It could in  any 
case constitute a debating point against the introduction of these powers. 
At  all events, the redistribution of seats in the Parliament could obviously not 
lead to strictly proportional representation because of the need to represent not 
only individuals but also the entities forming the Community.  The Working 
Party considers that such a possible redistribution should not, any more than 
election  by  direct  suffrage,  constitute a  precondition for  the increase of  the 
Parliament's powers, at least within the limited context defined by the present 
report.  Certain  members  of  the  Working  Party,  however,  believe  that,  to 
counter  the  objection  mentioned  above,  the  Parliament  should  exercise  the 
powers of co-decision to be given  it during the second stage specified in the 
previous  chapter  under  a  system  by  which  a  qualified  majority  would  be 
required in certain circumstances, in order thus to prevent a discrepancy between 
the votes of representatives and the number of those represented. 
A third precondition, finally,  should likewise  be  rejected,  namely that of the 
creation  of  a  "real"  European  Government  which  would  be  regarded  as  a 
sine qua non for the existence of a "real" Parliament and consequently for the 
increase  of the  Parliament's  powers.  The fact  is  that,  as  the  concept  of  a 
"real" European Government is  anything but clearly defined, there would be a 
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risk here of getting caught again in one of those vicious circles with which the 
subject under discussion is  unfortunately fraught. 
In short, the introduction of new powers for the Parliament, as justified above, 
cannot  depend  on  the  introduction  of  election  by  direct  universal  suffrage. 
If, as a result of circumstances which cannot be predicted, the increase of parlia-
mentary powers were to precede direct election, this first  success  would only 
make the achievement  of  the  other objective  more  desirable  and  no  doubt, 
more likely. 
SECTION II 
ELECTION BY  DIRECT UNIVERSAL  SUFFRAGE 
1.  The importance of election  by  direct  universal  suffra~e 
The introduction of direct elections would be  important first of all because it 
would  draw  attention  afresh  to  the  partly,  or  even  wholly,  forgotten 
Article 138(3)  of the EEC Treaty, which, in fact, is one of the articles on which 
most future plans had been based. 
Furthermore, direct elections would considerably co~tribute to the Community's 
democratization and  consequently,  to its  authentication,  its  legitimation.  It 
should promote a  closer union between thr:'  European peoples. 
The electoral scheme to be offered to the peoples of Europe would no doubt also 
constitute a unifying factor because it would encourage existing parties to take 
a  stand on European rather than on national  political  questions.  The new 
election  formula could also  stimulate the formation  of  wider  units  grouping 
together the various related political parties represented in the Member States. 
Naturally, certain problems cannot be ignored: the choice of the best possible 
circumstances for the response to and the success of the elections; the need to 
establish  new  links  between  the  European  Parliament  and  the  national 
parliaments when, as  a result of the reformed system, it is  no longer possible 
to rely  on the community of personnel between these institutions.  But these 
problems  can  be  overcome  and as  this  report will  show,  their presence has 
not prevented the Working Party from recommending that election  by  direct 
universal suffrage should be subject to a timetable. 
2.  The timetable 
It has already been said that the Parliament has drawn up a draft to implement 
Article  138  of the EEC  Treaty but that as  the Council has not yet  taken a 
decision on the matter, no further action has been taken.  Although from the 
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legal point of view, the draft has not become null and void, in political terms it 
cannot be  regarded  as· up  to  date, especially  since it was  worked out in the 
absence  of  the States now  about to join the Community.  Before the matter 
can be  considered again, we should wait until the representatives  of  the new 
States can take their seats in  the Parliament and assume their full  deliberative 
tasks.  This takes us  up to 1 January 1973. 
From  that  moment,  however,  a  solution  to  the  problem  must  be  sought 
without loss of time, under a procedure excluding chances of new or indefinite 
postponements.  For  this  reason,  it  is  highly  desirable  that the  institutions 
involved should, by  common agreement, fix a series of deadlines by which the 
different phases  of  procedure leading to election  by  direct  universal suffrage 
and the actual parliamentary elections themselves, should be completed. 
Some  members  of  the  Working Party  believed  that the deadlines  should  be 
clearly specified in the present report.  In their opinion, the proposals provided 
for  in Article 138  of  the  EEC  Treaty, concerning t-he  introduction of parlia-
mentary  elections  by  direct  universal  suffrage,  should  be worked out within 
two years following the Parliament's enlargement; three more years should be 
set  aside  for  their  application,  including  the  Council's  decision  and  its 
ratification by the Member States. 
Other members  of the Working Party, however,  believe that the length of the 
period  within  which  this  complex  procedure  should  be  completed  closely 
depends  on political  circumstances  which  the  Working  Party  cannot foresee 
with  any  degree  of  accuracy.  Nevertheless,  they  consider  that  the  Com-
munity  institutions  concerned  should  put forward  a _programme  themselves, 
together with a timetable, so as  to avoid indefinite postponements. 
The Working· Party as  a  whole has come out strongly in favour of the time-
table  method,  under  which  all  the  institutions  involved  will,  at  the  right 
moment, be drawn into and play their part in the complex procedute provided 
for in the Treaties. 
In order to avoid any  misunderstanding, it should once more be pointed out 
that  in  the  opinion  of  the  Working  Party,  there  is  no chronological inter-
dependence  between  direct  elections  and the increase  of  the powers  of  the 
European  Parliament;  there  is  neither  any  order  of  priority  nor  necessary 
simultaneity between the achievement of these two objectives.  Any  obstacles 
encountered on the road towards the realization  of  one of them  should not 
stand in the way of that of the other. 
The difficulties involved in attempting to determine and enforce the timetable 
may  vary  according  to  the  interpretation  given  to  the  phrase  "uniform 
procedure" used in Article 138  of the EEC Treaty to define the electoral rules 
to be worked out by the Parliament for elections by direct universal suffrage. 
If this  phrase  is  taken  to  mean  a  "single  electoral  system"  (even  with  the 
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possibility  of  minor optional variations within the system),  it will  be  rather 
difficult  to  draw  up  the  proposals in  question  because  of  the differences  in 
electoral systems  in the  Member States  and applicant  states.  However,  the 
Working  Party  believes  that  Article  138  may  be  reasonably  interpreted  as 
meaning that the  members  of the European Parliament could  be  elected  by 
direct universal suffrage under the electoral system applied in each individual 
country.  At any rate, this  solution, in accordance with the provisions of the 
Dehousse report, could be regarded as an acceptable transitional one until more 
favourable conditions arise for working out a single electoral law taking account 
of the experience gained in the interval. 
Two members of the Working Party, however, have emphasized the need for 
introduction  of  a  single  electoral  system  in  the fairly  near  future  so  as  to 
facilitate the formation of political groups at European level.  In this context, 
they regret that the Working Party has failed to examine the possibilities. of a 
European electoral law.  They further believe  that, whatever polling method 
will ultimately be adopted, it ought to involve more than one electoral district 
in each Member State.  In the various countries, polling should be  organized 
on a regional basis in _order  to make it more difficult to identify the political 
with the national affiliations of the voters. 
Nevertheless,  most  members  of  the Working Party  believe  that the question 
whether  a  single  electoral  law is  called  for  is  not of  major importance.  It 
depends first  of all  on the views  on the matter entertained by  the European 
Parliament itself.  Besides,  the difficulty  of  working out a  uniform electoral 
system acceptable to all Member States, both old and new, of the Community 
might once again slow down and postpone for  a  long time, implementation 
of the provisions of Article 138. 
3.  Prospects  of achieving  the  objectives  on a  national basis 
Seeing that no further steps were taken on the basis  of  the Dehousse report, 
parliamentarians and parliamentary groups in various  Member States  and in 
Italy even  members of  the public,  have put forward proposals for legislation 
under which,  in  the  Member  States  in  question,  members  of  the European 
Parliament would be elected by  direct universal suffrage without infringement 
of the  condition  in  Article  138(1)  of  the EEC  Treaty  requiring  them to  be 
members of their national parliament and designated by it. 
Admittedly, there are objections to such national proposals.  In so far as they 
tend. to  "nationalize"  European  elections,  they  cannot  have  the  same  stim-
ulating  effect  for  ·European  integration  as  simultaneous  elections  in  all  the 
Member  States.  Direct  election  of  members  of  the  European  Parliament 
effected in isolation in one of  the Member States would not be conducive to 
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the creation of European parties and would not mobilize public opinion at a 
European  level.  Besides,  if  this  system  were  applied,  the  members  of  the 
European Parliament would differ not only in nationality, as now, but also in 
electoral origin (direct or indirect suffrage).  And finally, in some of the Member 
States at least, the small number of seats available would make it difficult to 
achieve  a  fair  representation  of  political  forces.  As  regards  this  last  point, 
we  may  add that the scheme provided for in  Article  138  of  the EEC  Treaty 
should involve an increase in the total membership of the European Parliament 
in order to guarantee adequate representation. 
Nevertheless, the national initiatives referred to above should not be ignored, 
at least in the medium term.  It should be noted that in political circles in the 
United  Kingdom there  have been discussions  recently  on the idea  of  directly 
electing,  at  the  same  time  as  the  general  elections,  thirty  members  of  the 
European Parliament who would also be regional representatives in the House 
of Commons; in addition, the House of Lords would send six of its  members 
to the European Parliament.  This system,  according to its  advocates, would 
not  be  fraught  with the serious  obstacles  that would  hinder British  support 
of a uniform European electoral system. 
The objections raised  above to proposals to· organize European elections  on 
an isolated national basis  would probably lose  much of  their weight if  such 
proposals  were  put forward  under  particularly  favourable  political  circum-
stances and consequently stimulated similar initiatives elsewhere. 
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Relations  between  the  European  Parliament 
and  the  national  parliaments 
SECTION I 
NEED FOR THESE  RELATIONS 
Though differing in  detail,  the democratic  systems  of  the Member States  of 
the  Community  are  essentially  the  same.  During  the  whole  period  of 
construction  of a  democratic  Community, the peoples of the Member States 
will continue to regard the national constitutional systems  as  the level  where 
the basic democratic process takes place. 
Direct elections to the European Parliament will no doubt promote the formation 
of  a  European party system,  but this  will  take time;  as  long  as  no genuine 
European parties have been established, the election process in the Community 
will  still  be largely  based on the national party systems  and on programmes 
and candidates connected mainly with national politics. 
Compared  with  the  powers  of  national parliaments,  those  of  the  European 
Parliament  appear  to  be  small.  For  an  indefinite  period  to  come,  the 
European Parliament will have no more than a right of co-decision alongside 
the  Council  and  will  only  have  responsibilities· in  fields  which,  though  no 
doubt very important, are limited compared with the powers of the national 
parliaments.  The  European  budget  will  be  far  smaller  and  have  a  much 
narrower scope than the budgets adopted by the national parliaments. 
As  in the past, it will  be  the national  parliaments  which will  provide those 
elected  with  the platform for  taking  effective  action  and for  building  up  a 
reputation in their parties and in the opinion of the electorate.  For a long time 
to come, the careers of politicians will be built up in a national context.  The 
national  parliament  will  continue  to  be  the  springboard  to  a  ministerial 
portfolio or a front-rank political position. 
For all  these  reasons,  the  national  politicians  will  not regard the European 
Parliament as a forum that is as interesting as the one they have in the national 
parliaments. 
It  is  therefore  vital  to  ensure  that  possible  rivalry  between  the  national 
parliaments  and the European Parliament does  not weaken the latter.  The 
national parliaments have means of  bringing direct influence to bear on their 
governments  whose  representatives  meet  in  the  Council.  In  this  way  they 
are  able  to support or oppose  the lines  taken by ·the European Parliament. 
This is  why the relations  between the European Parliament and the national 
parliaments must be  close.  From the point of view of European integration, · 
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one may even wish to see  true interpenetration on the lines  of the Dehousse 
report;  this  would  establish  a  link  between  the  national  democratic  process 
and  the  Community  democratic  process.  It  will  thus  be  possible  for  a 
two-way movement to emerge which would be  of  the  utmost  benefit  to the· 
parties in either process:  the national parliaments will  support the European 
Parliament and the European Parliament will  be able to make its  policies felt 
and  perhaps  exert  a  coordinating  influence  on  national  parliamentary  life. 
The  interpenetration  thus  required  concerns  both  men  and  activities,  as 
outlined below.  . 
As  stated in the  preceding  chapter,  election  of  the European  Parliament  by 
direct universal suffrage will no doubt be conducive to a certain differentiation 
between politicians active at European level  and politicians active at national 
level.  This is  a desirable development, but as  said before, certain mechanisms; 
such as  the ones to be described here, would help to avoid a rupture between 
the European parliamentary institution and the  national parliamentary insti-
tutions. 
SECTION II 
INSTITUTIONAL  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  TI{E  EUROPEAN  PARLIA-
MENT AND  THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS 
1.  The dual  mandate 
In  practice,  the  principal  link  between  the  national  parliaments  and  the 
European  Parliament  consists  today  in  the  existence  of  the  members  dual 
mandate from both assemblies, which creates a sort of personal union. 
The main drawback of the system lies in the increase in the European Parliament's 
activities, in itself a happy circumstance.  In 1971, a European deputy had to 
attend, on average, plenary  meetings  to a  total of 45  days and 25  committee 
meetings,  some of  which lasted more than one day;  this takes.no account of 
the separate meetings of the political groups of the European Parliament. 
Such a crowded programme deters the national political groupings from sending 
to the European Parliament too large a  number of top rank national parlia-
mentarians who would be particularly representative of the government parties 
or the opposition but whose frequ~nt and prolonged absence would hinder the 
work of the national parties and parliaments. 
The composition of the European Parliament does not necessarily suffer from 
this  circumstance.  For instance,  the  parliamentary  parties  send  to  it  well-
qualified young politicans who thus gain valuable experience.  The danger lies 
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elsewhere.  Owing to the very fact that they attend to their European mandate, 
the  members  involved  do  not  exercise  sufficient  influence  in  the  national 
parliament from which they are often missing.  Exercise of the two mandates 
simultaneously therefore has its drawbacks. 
To reduce these drawbacks, it has  sometimes been suggested that a system of 
deputy members should be set up, to enable the prominent politicians who are 
regular  members  to  participate  only  in  the  most  important  debates  and -to 
entrust the task  of  dealing with the European Parliament's day-to-day work 
to their deputies. 
Against  this  proposal  it  has  been  urged  that  the  institution  of  deputy 
membership is contrary to the very idea of a representative system and foreign 
to  parliamentary  tradition.  These  considerations  will  carry  all  the  more 
weight as  the European Parliament gains in power and prestige. 
The European Parliament, which, in drawing up the proposals referred to in 
Article 138  of the EEC Treaty, will have the primary responsibility for solving 
this question, will be confronted with these aspects whenever the deputy member 
issue is  debated. 
Another suggestion is that the drawbacks of the dual mandate could be reduced 
by  cutting  down the time  which  the  members  of  the European  Parliament 
must spend on their work.  The volume of work in the European Parliament 
will, in fact, remain smaller than that in the national p·arliaments for quite some 
time  yet.  In  the  opinion  of  the  Working  Party,  the  European  Parliament 
could profit from this situation by harmonizing its activities with those of the 
national  parliaments.  The  national  parliaments  would  have  to  make  a 
similar effort, supported, it is  hoped, by the parties.  It has also been pointed 
out above that in the matters of list  A  or list B outlined in chapter IV,  the 
European  Parliament  could  agree  to  be  relieved  of  the  problems  of imple-
mentation, leaving these to the Council or Commission. 
The  link  established  between  the  national  parliaments  and  the  European 
Parliament  by  the dual  mandate must  be  maintained.  Nevertheless  there is 
still the problem of attracting to the European Parliament the greatest possible 
number of outstanding politicians. . The strengthening of powers recommended 
in chapteriV may in itself produce this result.  An increase in the number of 
members  of  the European Parliament  would work in the same  direction  by 
reducing the drawbacks of absences. 
As  has  been  seen  already,  direct election  by  universal  suffrage will no doubt 
change many of the aspects  of this  problem.  But  despite the differentiation 
between  national  political  careers  and  European  political  careers  that  may 
result, it will still be desirable that a common core of parliamentarians should 
ensure  communication  between  the  national  parliaments  and  the  European 
Parliament. 
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2.  Links  between the national parliaments  and the European Parliament 
Consideration  could  be  given  to  establishing  links  between  the  European 
Parliament and  the  national  parliaments  by  providing that the  chairmen  or 
certain members of the national parliamentary committees dealing with problems 
relating to the Community should automatically be members of the European 
Parliament.  In this  way they would be able  to  acquaint themselves,  in the 
committees  and  plenary  meetings  of  the  European  Parliament,  with  the 
problems relating to their work at national level  and, conversely, they  could 
bring the views of their committees and national parliaments to the knowledge 
of the European Parliament. 
But this  idea  would  be difficult to institutionalize.  · Like  the solution  based 
on deputy  membership,  it is  rather foreign  to  parliamentary  traditions  and 
parliamentary spirit.  Other solutions must therefore be envisaged. 
We must see exactly where the main difficulty lies. 
It is  legitimate and democratic that national parliaments should try to bring 
their  influence  to  bear  within  the  Community.  In  the  absence  of effective 
links  with  the  European  Parliament,  the  temptation  is  great  for  them  to 
exercise this influence through the body which is  within their reach, namely, 
their government and the representatives this government sends to the Council. 
In  some  countries,  notably  Germany  and  the  Netherlands,  the  national 
parliament has at its  disposal institutional means enabling it to inf~rm itself 
about the activities of its government at Community level, and, consequently, 
control these activities. 
The principle  of  the  national  parliaments  controlling  the  activities  of  their 
governments at Community level is  democratic.  Carried to extremes, it could 
lead  to a  situation  where  the parliaments,  by  stating their views,  leave 'the 
governments  so  little  room  for  manceuvre  that the  representatives  of  these 
governments are unable to negotiate or decide on their own within the Council. 
If the national  parliam~nts were given reliable means  of communicating with 
the European institutions through the European Parliament, this would prevent 
any  weakening of  national democratic control while avoiding the dangers  of 
exaggeration. 
To this end, there should be joint meetings  of the specialized committees of 
the  national  parliaments  and  the  European  Parliament  to  study important 
problems.  As said before, these meetings would give parliamentarians a feeling 
of confidence towards the Community and would render unduly meddlesome 
control  of  Parliament over  the national  ministers  superfluous.  In  addition, 
these joint meetings would bring parliamentarians without a European mandate 
into contact with the Community and would lead to a better knowledge of the 
problems  of  Europe,  indirectly  strengthening  the  influence  of  the European 
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Parliament in the national parliaments.  These meetings would doubtless also 
help  to  multiply  the  fruitful  contacts  between  .. the  various  parliaments' 
specialists  on technical  questions.  Provided this  procedure is  only  used  for 
truly  important  questions,  there  is  reason  to  hope  that  it  will  not  unduly 
overload the agendas and timetables of national and European, parliamentarians. 
SECTION III 
SPECIAL  TREATMENT  TO  BE  GIVEN  TO  EUROPEAN  PROBLEMS 
WITHIN NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS 
In the national parliaments there are as  yet  hardly· any  specialized  bodies or 
procedures for dealing with European problems.  Consideration could be given 
to setting up, within the national parliaments, committees for European affairs 
. which would have the task of coordinating the national parliamentary work 
relating to Europe.  Naturally these committees would have to include many 
members of the European Parliament.  One of the advantages of this procedure 
would be that it  would help to ensure that national' legislation is  not drawn 
up  simply  side  by  side  with  European  legislative  work  and  without  any 
connection with that work. 
SECTION IV 
IMPROVEMENT  OF  TECHNICAL  CONDITIONS  FOR  THE  FUNCT-
IONING OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
The  practical  conditions  under  which  the  members'  European  mandate  is 
exercised  are  of  genuine  importance  for  the  smooth  functioning  of  the 
European Parliament.  Problems such as  the information of parliamentarians, 
the  technical  or  administrative  assistance  which  they  may  receive  and  the 
conditions of work in general  must  be taken into consideration.  No one is 
more aware of this need than the European Parliament itself. 
Special  mention should perhaps be  made of a  point which at first sight may 
appear to be a  minor one but is  of greater importance than one would think. 
This is the problem of transport.  It should be normal for a representative from 
any Member State or future Member State of the Community to be able on one 
and the same day to attend a meeting for instance in the European Parliament 
in the morning and one in his national parliament in the afternoon.  If existing 
commercial  transport  facilities  are  not  sufficient,  the  European  Parliament 
should envisage organizing a transport system of its own. 
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SECTION V 
INCIDENCE  AT  PARLIAMENTARY  LEVEL  OF  THE  STEPS  TAKEN 
TO ACHIEVE  ECONOMIC AND  MONETARY UNION 
The· situation  that  will  be  created  by  the  establishment  of  economic  and 
monetary union provides a fresh and striking illustration of the need for close 
and  new  relations  between  the  national  parliaments  and  the  European 
Parliament. 
Extension of the Community's activities to one or other new subject produces 
an effect that has already been  referred to: it involves the transfer of powers 
from  the  national  parliaments  not to  the  European  Parliament  but to  the 
Council.  The increase in the powers of the European Parliament recommended 
in chapter IV will no doubt reduce the distortion mentioned but will not eliminate 
it completely. 
One might be  tempted to believe  that the above transfer of powers is  a  less 
serious matter in the case of a large number of the activities that will form part 
of economic and monetary union than in the case of other activities which are 
easier  to  define  in  legal  terms  and  which,  in  the  national  parliaments,  are 
largely legislative in nature.  For instance, important instruments of short-term 
economic policy and monetary policy, such as interest rates or exchange rates 
do  not,  in  general,  come  under  the  direct  responsibility  of  the  national 
parliaments, so that transfer to the Community of the right to take decisions 
on them would not imply a weakening of democratic control over them. 
This would be  an erroneous  view  based  on a  misunderstanding of political 
realities.  For, while the national parliaments are fairly detached from technical 
problems of a monetary and even an economic nature, the way they judge the 
results of the economic policy pursued by their governments is a major element 
in their confidence or lack of it in them. 
If the  establishment  of  economic  and  monetary  union  produces  a  common 
short-term economic policy and monetary policy, the guidelines and, sometimes, 
the  joint  decisions  connected  with  these  policies  will  have  an  influence  on 
national life;  otherwise they will  have no  significance at all.  There is  every 
reason  to  believe  that  the  national  parliaments  will  not  be  satisfied  by 
explanations given  by their governments,  even  if  they  are well-founded, that 
such  and such a  result,  considered to  be  an unfortunate one in the country, 
stems  from  a  decision  taken  at  the  level  of  the  European  institutions, 
partiCularly  by  their  technical  bodies.  This  would  create  a  false  situation 
which would reduce the national governments to a choice between failing the 
'community in  its  drive  for  economic  and  monetary  union  or risking  their 
existence before the national parliaments, which,  as  has  been said, have little 
inclination to rest content with excuses, even justified excuses. 
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The  solution  would  be  to  make  the  members  of  the  national  parliaments 
themselves feel  committed to the common short-term economic and monetary 
policy.  But  this  will  be  possible  only  if  the  interpenetration  of  national 
parliaments with the European Parliament, referred to above, becomes a reality 
and if there are precise arrangements for informing national parliamentarians 
about the decision-making process in the Community and involving them in 
it one way or another. 
The general methods  outlined earlier in this  chapter are of course applicable 
to  this  field.  They  must  be  strengthened  through  the  estabHshment  of  a 
forum in which the national and the European parliamentarians can meet and 
in which the short-term economic policy  pursued in the Community and its 
impact  on national  policies  would  be  analysed  critically  and,  if  feasible,  m 
public, with the people responsible for these policies at the various levels. 
The procedure described  could  also  be  extended  to  cover the medium- and 
long-term problems. 
This will  bring about the establishment,  along practical rather than juridical 
lines,  of  a  system of information, dialogue and control particularly necessary 
in  a  field  where  parliamentarians,  paradoxically,  though  sometimes  put off 
by the technical aspects of the problems, are not any less demanding as regards 
the  results  obtained.  It  would  be  a  great  threat  to  Europe  if  the  very 
important progress that will  be  made in the shape of economic and monetary 
union were a  source of  misunderstanding among all  the various  parties con-
tributing their shares: national parliaments, national governments, the Council, 
the Commission, the European Parliament, the Committee of Central Banks, 
t~chnical and financial experts, etc. 
SECTION  VI 
TOWARDS  A  COLLECTIVE  SYSTEM  OF  PARLIAMENTARY  COOR-
DINATION 
There is  a  real need to ensure that the European Parliament and the national 
parliaments  do  not work  as  completely  separate  and  autonomous  decision-
making  centres.  The juridical  and sociological  processes  referred  to in this 
chapter must lead to the construction, in the more or less long term, of some 
sort of communications network that engenders consensus. 
Several national parliaments have made it clear that they wish to see the role 
of the European Parliament  strengthened.  They  now have  the opportunity 
to put their wish  into  practice,  using  procedures  which  do  not require  any 
amendment of the Treaties. 
s.  4/72  71 Relations between the European Parliament and the national parliaments 
Here,  everything depends  on their political  will  and their innovating ability. 
This chapter provides  a  number of pointers which have  been devised in this 
sense. 
There are other suggestions pointing in the same direction.  Examples include 
links  between  the  Presidents  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  national 
parliaments,  particularly  for  harmonization  of  the  programmes  of  these 
assemblies; information about the debates held in the respective bodies; perhaps 
a  system  providing for  the  drawing-up  of an  annual  report or even  a  joint 
annual report discussing the various issues. 
Overall,  the whole set of initiatives  to be taken along these lines,  initiatives 
which concern the parliaments themselves, tends to create a kind of symbiosis 
between national and European parliamentary life.  The society thus created 
will  undoubtedly  be  subject  to change.  The extension of  the powers of  the 
European Parliament and its election by universal suffrage, will give it the role 
of synthesizing disparate interests  and mediating  between them.  This is  the 
normal path followed  by  the development of the parliamentary institution in 
the historical experience of  national and federal  integration,  and there is  no 
cause to  depart from  it  in  this  case.  In  concluding  this  chapter,  it  should 
simply  be stated that the differentiation in the legal roles  of  the pa-rliaments 
at the different levels does not contradict the other process; rather, it is  given 
powerful  support  by  the  sociological  phenomena  of interpenetration  of  the 
activities,  of the political functions,  of the groups of people exercising them 
and of the institutions. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Adjustments  to  the  Institutions 
of the  Community 
THE NECESSARY  UNITY  OF THE COMMUNITY SYSTEM 
On the eve of closer collaboration between the Member States which is to take 
them  beyond  the  customs  union  to  the  establishment  of  an  economic  and 
monetary ·union and to the development  of common policies in other fields 
besides  that  of  agriculture,  it  is  necessary  to  draw  attention  to  a  twofold 
danger  threatening  both  the  effectiveness  and  the  democratic  nature of the 
intended development.  This danger consists, on the one hand, in the tendency 
to put too narrow an interpretation on Community powers and on the other, 
in  the  proliferation  of  inter-governmental  bodies  and  committees  operating 
on the fringe of the Community's institutional framework. 
It has  been  noted  that  in  the  new  spheres  of  action,  the  partners  in  the 
Community are tending too often to restrict the scope of the Treaties to current 
activities  and  to  carry  out  their  policies  along  non-Community  lines.  The 
reasons for this tendency are complex, but one of them is, without doubt, the 
governments' desire to keep their hands free in the new spheres of action.  The 
growth in the number of inter-governmental bodies and committees is  also in 
part due  to the national administrations' desire to take part in the decision-
making  processes  and  this,  although  not necessarily  without its  advantages 
as regards, in particular, the sociological integration of groups belonging to the 
~dministrative  class,  represents  a  real  danger  to  the  unity  of  Community 
activities. 
The  persistence  of  such  tendencies,  entailing  the  multiplication  of  inter-
governmental  practices  at the  outer limits  of  Community procedures  which, 
however,  have  proved  their  value  in  the  past,  brings  with  it  the risk  of a 
reduction  in  the  decision-making  capacity  of  the  bodies  responsible  for  the 
new policies. 
The cohesion of Community policy in its entirety will  be threatened.  More-
over, the provisions of the Treaties will have been nullified  by  the avoidance 
of control by Parliament and the courts, which is  essential to any democratic 
legal system. 
At a  time when a  whole variety  of experience shows that the Europe of the 
Treaties is  wide open as  regards both its make-up and its spheres of activity, 
the  Working  Party  believes  that  European  integration  must  under  no 
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circumstances be  allowed to languish.  New activities  must be  carried out in 
the framework  of  the Community institutional  system  and  be  based  on the 
Treaties,  making  use  of  all  the  possibilities  they  offer  including  those  of 
Article 235  of the EEC Treaty and resorting, should circumstances so  require, 
to the revision procedure in Article 236. 
It must be borne in mind that the Commission, along with the Council, is the 
only  institution able to take in the whole range of  common activities  and to 
ensure continuously the coordination and cohesion of initiatives. 
There  is  no  doubt  that,  in  fields  going  beyond  the  scope  of  the  Treaties, 
cooperation between the States can, in certain cases, produce extra-Community 
bodies which will initiate what may one day be a common policy.  Nevertheless, 
the  Community  institutions,  including  the  Commission  and  the  Parliament, 
should be associated with the work of these bodies  whene\rer  it affects  appli-
cation of the Treaties in any way. 
But,  apart  from  this  case,  if  new  committees  conststmg  of  high  national 
officials  have  to  be  established  they  must  be  slotted  into  the  Community 
structure and linked up with both the Council and the Commission in the same 
way as  the Monetary Committee (Art.  105  of the EEC  Treaty). 
This  is  the necessary  starting-point for all  considerations on the adjustments 
to be made to the Community institutional system. 
SECTION  II 
GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  GOVERNING  ADJUSTMENTS  TO  THE 
INSTITUTIONS 
It  is  clear  that  if  the  proposals  made  above  on  the  extension  of  the 
Parliament's  powers  are  to  be  implemented,  the  relationship  between  the 
institutions  will  undergo  some  changes.  The Parliament,  which  until  how 
has been somewhat divorced from the major Community responsibilities, will 
share them with the Council and the Commission. 
The Working Party has found it essential to examine, in the light of imminent 
developments  such  as  the economic  and monetary union, the changes  which 
would be  entailed  or required  by  the extension  of the  Parliament's powers.· 
However,  it  has  not  neglected  the  longer-term  questions.  The  measures 
proposed, proceeding from the very diversity of opinions on certain questions, 
must  also  be  considered  as  a  means  for  quickening  the  pace  of  European 
integration. 
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Hence the  present  institutional  system  will  be taken  as  a  starting-point  and 
there will  be an examination,  linked  with  what has been said  above  on the 
Parliament's powers, of the adjustments which can be made to this system in 
the  foreseeable  future.  Finally,  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  ascertain  the 
conditions making for an effective democratic system. 
Since future  developments are to take place within the fabric  of the existing 
organization, they will have to satisfy two indispensal;>le conditions. 
Firstly, the association between the Council and the Commission must remain 
one of the cornerstones of the Community system.  The Commission represents 
the truly common interest in the fields which are open to Community action, 
whereas the Council embodies the political will of and the cooperation between, 
the  various  States,  united  to  carry  out  Community  tasks.  The  European 
Parliament will  be  involved  in both these functions.  It will  be  not only the 
means for expressing a  "general European will"  but also  the form for public 
opinion in the Member States. 
Secondly, it must not be forgotten that the structure of the Community is  not 
the same as  that of the  national political systems.  It does  not work on the 
traditional  principle  of  separation  of  powers.  The  Community  system  is 
based more on distinction and collaboration between national and integrating 
forces.  This  explains  the  difference  between  its  true  Community  function 
and that of  providing an outlet for national political desires-between which 
functions, as had been said, the European Parliament acts as  a bridge. 
If these conditions are fulfilled,  the extension of the Parliament's powers and 
the reactivation of institutional development must be along three lines. 
First of all,  let it  be repeated that the new development of European policies 
must not only respect the unity of the Community but also strengthen it. 
Secondly-and this is  the logical consequences of what has just been said-the 
Commission must be more than ever a centre for Community ideas, initiatives, 
mediation and administration.  In this respect, the Treaties' initial design must 
be preserved. 
Thirdly, the Council's decision-making capacity must be strengthened so  that 
it can meet the future demands of political control in fields which are becoming 
increasingly  complex,  varied  and interdependent.  If,  as  we  have  proposed, 
the Parliament's powers are reinforced, the relations between the Council and 
the . Assembly  will  of  necessity  become  closer  and  more  assured.  This 
communications systen;  should not,  however, develop  into  a  dialogue  which 
would  exclude  or  weaken  the  role  of  the  Commission,  mouthpiece  of  the 
common interest. 
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SECTION III 
THE COMMISSION 
The Commission's role  as  planner, initiator and mediator, mentioned above, 
indicates that it is  indeed a political body in the widest sense of the term.  Its 
political character needs to be strengthened in various respects.  For instance, 
this would be  achieved if the Commission had more members who were also 
prominent political figures  and if  the dual investiture of the President of  the 
Commission  by  the  government  and  by  the  Parliament,  as  proposed  in 
Chapter IV, were introduced. 
The  Commission's  administrative  role,  which  is  more  important than  ever, 
should  be  consolidated  in .  ~iew of  the  threats  arising  from  the dispersal  of 
various  organs  of  European  cooperation  outside  the  Community  system. 
It is  unnecessary to go  over this matter again. 
In the more sustained dialogue which will  take shape between the Parliament 
and the Council,  the  Commission will  have a  vital  role to play, particularly 
in  facilitating  cooperation  between  the  two  institutions  and  in  promoting 
establishment of the consensus necessary for joint decision-making. 
We should not conceal from ourselves that the enlargement of the Commission, 
resulting from the entry of the new members of the Community, may create 
certain difficulties  affecting  the coherence  of  the  Commission's  work.  This 
problem  is  partly  amenable  to  administrative  solutions  upon  which  the 
Working Party is  not competent to.  pronounce.  It can merely point out that 
a larger Commission will need to establish a system capable of supervising all 
the institution's various operations and of avoiding the dispersal and separate 
growth  of  Community  administration  in  sectors  which  are  autonomous  or 
insufficiently interconnected. 
The Working Party feels it should stress once again the need to strengthen the 
position of  the President  of  the  Commission,  whose  powers  are  too  limited 
because of the duration of his mandate and because he is  not in the full sense 
the leader of the team.  In this connection we draw attention to our proposals 
for  a  four-year  mandate  and  a  system  of  parliamentary  investiture  of  the 
President of the Commission. 
Finally, if the economic and monetary union comes into being, quick procedures 
for  urgent  decisions  will  probably have to  be instituted.  These procedures 
should be the responsibility of the Commission, assisted, where necessary,  by 
technical bodies possibly modelled on the Agricultural Management Committees. 
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SECTION IV 
THE COUNCIL 
1.  Decision-making powers  and blocking 
The proposals made above in no way impair the position of the Council whose 
legislative  and executive  role  continues  to  be  of primary  importance.  The 
real problem for the Council is  how to restore to it an increased capacity for 
decision-making and to remove  as  many as  possible  of the blockages  which 
tend to result from its current deficiency in this respect.  These blockages must 
not be allowed to multiply to the point where the Parliament becomes associated 
with a sort of power of "non-decision". 
The situation was analysed above and the point was  stressed that it was not 
a  matter of  undermining the Council's prerogatives but rather of  placing the 
Council in a  position to exercise them-notably by  reactivating the majority 
principle  of voting in  the sense  described  in  Chapter III  above.  As  for  the 
problem of the blocking of decision-making procedures by inertia, it must be 
conceded that it is  difficult to find solutions without interfering with Council 
prerogatives.  In fact, any system which penalized a prolonged inaction by the 
Council  by  means  of  some  rule  which  allowed  the  Council,  in  such 
circumstances,  to  be  bypassed  in  the  decision-making  process  would  be 
tantamount to changing one of the basic elements of the Treaties.1 
In  view  of  this,  other  procedures  of  a  less  compulsive  and  more  flexible 
character were  sought.  The  most  appropriate in  the view  of  the Working 
Party seemed to be the following. 
When  a  Commission  proposal  on  which  the Parliament  has  formulated  an 
opinion is  referred to it, the Council at the request of the Commission would 
indicate the time  required to prepare its  position.  Should the time-limit  be 
exceeded  substantially,  the  Commission,  if  it  considered  the  matter  urgent, 
could bring the situation before the Parliament and on the basis of the latter's 
opinion, submit a  request to the Council for a  decision within the time-limit 
proposed by the Parliament. 
Should the Council fail to decide  by  the set  date, the Commission would be 
entitled to consider its proposal finally rejected and to inform the Parliament 
accordingly. 
It is  important for the effective functioning  of  the Community's  institutions 
that the Parliament, Commission and Council should between them establish 
1  However, see the opinion of two members of the Working Party on this subject in chapter IV 
above, section II § 4 in fine. 
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agreed programmes of work, covering fairly long periods, with clear time-tables 
and regular joint reviews.  In particular, it would be desirable to establish close 
liaison  between the President of the  Council  and the President of the  Com-
mission in order to organize the work of both these institutions in an orderly 
fashion.  Although  it  is  unlikely  that  these  practices  would  overcome  the 
blockages  which  are  due  to  political --causes,  they  might  at  least  help  to 
disentangle certain cases where the obstruction is to some extent of a technical 
character. 
2.  The problem of European Ministers 
On  several  occasions  and  recently  again,  proposals  have  been  made  to 
strengthen  the  Council's  position  by  appointing  European  Ministers  who, 
on the one hand, would represent their country in tbe Community and on the 
other, take part in domestic cabinet discussions  where they could put across 
European points of view. 
This  proposal must be seen from two different angles,  each of which has its 
own significance. 
It is possible to visualize true European Ministers playing a major part in their 
domestic governments  and in the  Council of the  Community.  To this  end, 
they  should  be  permanent  occupants  of  their  Government's  seats  in  the 
Council  and collaborate  with  specialist  Ministers  in  attendance for  specific 
matters  without  prejudice  to  their  position  as  Council  members.  This 
presupposes that they hold one of the top positions in their home governments 
and  perform  the  role  of  general  coordinator  for  the  other  ministerial 
departments where these are concerned with European affairs. 
Seen in this light the proposal is of real interest.  It would need to be spelt out 
and this presents difficulties in view of the different ways in which government 
and relations between the head of State, the head of government and officials 
in charge of ministerial departments are organized in the various countries of 
the present or enlarged Community. 
However, it is  also  possible to envisage European Ministers of another sort. 
They  would  rather  be Junior Ministers,  who  within the Community  would 
represent at political  as  well  as  diplomatic level  their government's enduring 
interest  in  European  affairs.  Their  involvement  in  government  discussions 
in  their  own  countries  would  have  the  advantages  of  close  relationship 
between  the  Community  institutions  and  the  domestic  governments.  A 
possible criticism of this idea is  the danger that it might create a body whose 
work would duplicate  that of  the  Committee of  Permanent Representatives. 
This criticism is perhaps not conclusive because it could be argued that it might 
be  a good thing for the function of the States' permanent representatives with 
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the Community institutions to be  raised to  a  political level,  thus facilitating 
dialogue with the Commission and the Parliament. 
In any case, it would be necessary to decide between these two ideas and ensure 
that their combination did not simply lead to complications in the workings of 
national governments and Community institutions. 
SECTION V 
SUMMIT MEETINGS 
The Hague Conference of December 1969 was a summit meeting which brought 
together the Heads of State or Government of the Member States and proved 
to be a means for launching new initiatives and taking decisions  on the more 
or less long-term programmes for Community activities. 
It has been proposed that such conferences be institutionalized by holding them 
at  regular  intervals  and  by  giving  them  the  set  task  of  plotting  the  main 
guidelines for the Community  . 
This proposal certainly has advantages.  Even though this has not always been 
the case in the past, political will  expressed at the highest level should give a 
decisive  impetus  to  the  mission  of  the  Community  institutions,  particularly 
of  the  Council.  Regular  meetings  would  bring  European  problems  to  the 
attention of governments, domestic parliaments and public opinion relatively 
frequently and renew their interest in them. 
However, the summit system, which may  be excellent in principle, comes up 
against a major criticism when it is  seen as  an institution meeting on a fixed 
date.  In fact,  given  the exceptional character which  a  meeting of Heads of 
State or Government must retain in Community negotiations, it should rather 
be the political events necessitating their intervention which decide the timing 
of meetings.  Summits held too frequently and at times when there is  no real 
political issue which really makes them necessary, could well lessen the merits 
of  the  institution.  In  addition,  there  is  a  serious  danger  that  Community 
-procedures, which_already move too slowly, would decelerate even more because 
the  authorities  responsible  for  making  decisions  would further  delay  taking 
up positions pending the next summit meeting. 
SECTION  VI 
LEGAL  SUPERVISION 
The Court of Justice has  been the crucial instrument in the development of 
Community  law  and  has  strengthened  the  institutional  structure  of  the 
s.  4/72 Adiustments to the Institutions of the Community 
Community.  To  what  extent  might  this  institution  be  affected  by  the 
proposals made in the preceding chapters? 
One first point is  obvious.  The Court supervises the legality of the activities 
.  of the Council and the Commission from the angle of observance of the rules 
of  ·competence,  form  and  substance.  This  supervision  must  neither  be 
weakened nor impaired by granting the Parliament greater powers, particularly 
the power of co-decision in legislation proposed in Chapter IV.  Involvement 
of the Parliament in the exercise of Community powers  should not result in 
the removal of Community activities from the objective check on their legality 
laid down in the Treaties.  . 
Is  it necessary to go any further?  In one aspect of its  control of legality the 
Court has power to settle disputes between the Council and the Commission 
when these are brought to it by one or the other of these institutions.  It may 
be  asked  whether  it should  not  be  possible  for  it to  be  seized  similarly  in 
disputes in which the Parliament might be involved.  -
This is  a  delicate question since it points to the possibility of  expanding the 
constitutional role of the Court.  It calls  to mind the well-known arguments 
of constitutional law concerning the intervention of the judge in the relationships 
of  the public  authorities  inter  se,  notably  in cases  where the  Parliament  is 
involved. 
The present report is  not the place to elucidate this  awkward problem.  Its 
solution  would  presuppose  a  knowledge  of  the  specific  terms  in  which  the 
implementation of  the propositions made above would be carried out. 
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Implementation  of the  proposed  reforms 
The reforms  and proposals described in the preceding chapters are not only 
diverse as to their aims and scope but can also be implemented in a large variety 
of ways. 
Certain suggestions  would merely  entail the elaboration of  existing practices 
based on the Treaties, or merely the retention or evc;n re-establishment of rules 
written  into  these  (notably  the  re-assertion  of  the  Commission's  role,  the 
revival of the principle of majority voting on Council decisions).  Even some 
of the new practices envisaged in certain parts of the report do not require to 
be given legal form. 
Others  however,  involve  more  far-reaching  innovations  in  the  institutional 
life  of the  Community.  It is  quite  obvious  that they  can assume  their true 
political  and  legal  importance  only  if they  are  formally  written  into  the 
Treaties.  Revision  of these can alone guarantee legal  security  by preventing 
possible retrogressive action and by allowing the juridical guarantees prescribed 
by  the  Treaties  to  fulfil  their  task  of  safeguarding  observation of  the rules. 
The process  of  formally  modifying  the  Treaties  is,  however  of  necessity,  a 
drawn-out one.  The question  must therefore be  put whether, pending such 
a revision, some of the proposals put forward could not be implemented or at 
the very  least,  begin to be implemented within the framework of the existing 
Treaties  by  establishing  practices  agreed  upon by the institutions  concerned. 
The answer to this question is, above all, a legal one.  However, considerations 
of a  more political nature may  affect the conclusion reached. 
SECTION I 
THE LEGAL  VIEWPOINT 
The Working Party did not consider that its  mandate implied a detailed legal 
study  of  the  procedures  whereby  the  proposals  it  has  put  forward  in  the 
preceding chapters might be realized. 
However,  the  Working  Party found  it impossible  not to  mention  the  legal 
problems involved in the implementation of its suggestions, as  this will enable 
the time required for such implementation to be determined and if desired, the 
different ways in which it must be achieved, to be explored. 
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The problem of the need for formal revision of the Treaties, or possible provision 
which would render this course unnecessary differs  according to the nature of 
the proposed reforms. 
The texts of the present Treaties seem to leave open a wide choice of ways in 
which  the proposals  concerning the composition  of  Community  institutions 
can be put into practice. 
Thus  the  guidelines  concerning  election  by  direct  universal  suffrage  (cf. 
Chapter V)  do not require any amendment to the Treaties.  This is  obvious 
as  regards a  broad interpretation of Article  138(3)  EEC to permit election to 
the  European  Parliament  by  direct  universal  suffrage  in  accordance  with 
national laws.  The situation would be different only if the election were to be 
accompanied  by  an  increase  in  the  number  of  members  of  the  European 
Parliamentas fixed in Article 138(2)  of the Treaty. 
Furthermore, the suggestions made concerning the nomination of the President 
and  members  of  the  Commission  affect  the  exercise  of  the  powers  of  the 
Member States and it appears that there is  nothing in the Treaties to prevent 
the latter nominating the President of the Commission in agreement  witl~ the 
European Parliament. 
On the other hand, as the texts stand at present, the Working Party's proposal 
that the President be nominated for a term of office of four years could not be 
implemented, formally at least, without revision of the Treaties. 
The problem of strengthening the European Parliament's participation in the 
taking of normative decisions or of improving relations between the institutions 
of the Community is  more complex.  The possibility for these institutions to 
develop their practices in this  direction is  limited only  by  the basic principle 
laid down in Article 4 of the EEC  Treaty which states that "each institution 
shall  act within the limits  of  the powers conferred upon it  by  this  Treaty". 
At the same time Article 155 of the EEC Treaty allows the Council to confer 
upon the Commission the broadest powers for the implementation of the rules 
it lays down. 
None the  less,  the  principle of a  fixed  distribution of functions  governs  the 
Community institutional  system.  And so  the  institutions  cannot be  free  to 
abandon powers attributed to them.  On the contrary, they have to assume 
all the political and legal responsibilities conferred upon them by the Treaties. 
This  prohibits  any  one  institution  from  imposing  limitations  on  its  own 
powers in favour of another institution, as this would result in the responsibility 
for measures to be  promulgated being shifted to the latter. 
This  does  not  mean  that the institutions  cannot improve  their  methods  of 
collaboration with one another.  Explicit provision for this is made for relations 
between the Council and the Commission in Article 15  of the Merger Treaty. 
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No similar text exists for the Parliament, but its character as  a parliamentary 
organ provides  sufficient  justification for  practical efforts  to  strengthen  and 
improve the means of control at its disposaL  The text of Article 149  of the 
EEC Treaty already reflects the concern to facilitate consideration of opinions 
of the European Parliament.  From this angle it can readily be imagined that 
the ·Council  would  agree  to  do  all  in  its  power to  avoid  setting  aside  the 
European Parliament's opinions, for example, in those fields  which appear to 
be the most important for the development of the Community. 
Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that there is  a certain limit beyond which 
a  practice  may  lead  to  a  veritable  shift  of  responsibility forbidden  under 
Article  4  of the EEC  Treaty.  It is  one thing for the Council to  adopt the 
opinions given  by the European Parliament: it would be quite another for it 
to consider itself legally bound to follow them in all circumstances.  This would; 
in fact,  mean that the Council would be  refusing to exercise the powers con-
ferred upon it as  such by the Treaties. 
And  so  it  can  be  concluded  that,  as  far  as  the  European  Parliament's 
participation  in  the  exercise  of  normative  powers  in  the  Community  is 
concerned, important progress can be  made in strengthening the role of this 
institution without immediate resort to revision of the Treaties.  This is true 
in  any  case  for 'the  proposed  innovations  that  would  allow  the  European 
Parliament to exercise, for a short period of time, a sort of suspensive veto on 
Council decisions.  These innovations  would respect  the consultative  nature 
of the European Parliament's role and would merely extend the power to give 
opinions already conferred upon it by the Treaties.  It is only at the stage when 
the European Parliament comes to be involved in the exercise of a true power 
of co-d~cision that there will be  a  shift of responsibility necessitating revision 
of  the Treaties.  These considerations  indicate  that there already is  a  quite 
substantial field in which the institutions can achieve results. 
This is  also true for the budgetary sphere, in view of the extent to which the 
texts already adopted allow scope for interpretations more or less  favourable 
to the European Parliament's  powers.  Here  again,  however,  any  extension 
of the Parliament's powers  of decision and control would have to be firmly 
anchored in a revision of the Treaties. 
SECTION II 
THE POLITICAL  VIEWPOINT 
The legal viewpoint has enabled us to define those procedures whereby this or 
that proposal put forward  in  this  report  can  be  implemented.  The choice 
between these methods, however, can be made only on the basis of a political 
viewpoint.  Let us try to bring together the essential facts. 
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The increase in the number of the Community's tasks will mean that national 
parliaments will  have  to  relinquish  further powers.  They will  be  the  more 
willing to accept such relinquishments-which will determine the future of the 
construction of Europe-if, in the areas concerned, the European Parliament's 
control and participation takes  over from them.  Even  more:  a  Europe that 
developed  without  at  the  same  time  developing  its  own  representative 
institutions  would  become  disloyal  to  the  common  democratic  ideal  of its 
member countries and would therefore be rejecting its origins. 
Contrary to what might be thought, the forthcoming entry of new members 
into  the  Community  does  not  mean  a  stagnation  of  its  activities  but  an 
accelerated rate of evolution.  In spite of certain forecasts, it appears that the 
new. partners of the Six,  far from  considering the structures into which they 
are about to enter as sacrosanct and the present stage of integration as being the 
limit for a  long time to come, are anxious to add their weight to that of the 
countries  that originally  signed  the Treaties  of Paris  and· Rome in  order to 
promote the growth of a democratic Europe. 
From a legal point of view, we have seen that certain proposals in this report 
do not justify revision of the Treaties, since in their case this would only involve 
unnecessary complications.  On the other hand, some proposals of- necessity 
imply  such  revision.  There  are,  however,  quite  numerous  cases  where, 
without any legal irregularity, practice may run ahead of the legal rule.  It is 
this last category which raises a problem. 
In fact, in terms of economy of means, we may prefer the road of empiricism 
and practice and patiently  await revision  of the Treaties.  But then there is 
the danger that practice may undo one day what practice did the day before: 
the establishment of a  custom is  always a  hazardous venture.  On the other 
hand, if priority were to be  accorded to revision of the Treaties so that any 
changes that occur will be guaranteed in written law, would we not be running 
the risk of wasting time? 
The Working Party  believes  that the first  course is  the right  one.  It offers 
more rapidly effective ways of achieving results: all that it requires is a political 
will  and  this  has  already  been  shown  to  exist  by  the  enlargement  of  the 
Community  and the  increasing  number of fields  in which  it is  active.  The 
Community must therefore pursue this  course as  far and as  fast as  possible. 
However, two ideas must be borne clearly in mind. 
The first  is  that partial achievement  of certain of  the objectives  pursued by 
means-of a scarcely formulated practice must be neither a reason nor a pretext 
for delaying necessary legal innovations indefinitely. 
The second is  that there  must be a  certain degree  of  coherence between the 
changes sought and it is on this that the present report attempts to throw light. 
If  these changes were brought about in a way that relied too much on  ·day-to-day, 
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almost accidental empiricism, the result would, undoubtedly, be contradictory 
and unbalanced.  Worse still, under the guise of a pragmatic approach, there 
would be the risk that a vast system of horse-trading would develop.  In this, 
the restoration and reform of the Community system, which the future develop-
ment of Europe requires, would be watered down into a number of minor and 
disconnected changes, these would not mark the beginnings of an evolutionary 
process but would be a  fa~ade concealing inaction. 
In any case, there will be no excuse for not turning immediately to the task of 
solving these problems which were the subject of the Working Party's terms of 
reference.  Even  a  limited  revision  of the Treaties  involves  a  long haul:  but 
the establishment, development and consolidation of political practices also take 
time.  In  a  rapidly  changing  world,  the  time  at  our  disposal  is  limited. 
Europe is  a  matter of historical urgency. 
No doubt  many  of  the  desired  objectives  seem  far  away.  This  is  another 
reason for getting down to work on them forthwith.  The higher the summit, 
the sooner the climbing party must set out. 
Brussels, 25 March 1972. 
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I  - The increase  in  the powers  of the  European Parliament 
(Chapter IV) 
A  - The extension of the Parliament's participation in the legislative function 
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2.  Power of co-decision 
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